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ABSTRACT 
Community Benefit Agreements (CBAs) are a relatively new land-use planning tool and there 
has been little evidence of incidence or success in benefiting communities who are a part of 
these agreements. This Major Paper examines how governmental relations, public policy, and 
socioeconomic status play a role in creating inequities within communities. This essay 
investigates how community benefits agreements can be used as a tool to redistribute wealth 
and back into local economies. Through case studies for the United States and Canada and 
interviews with key informants, I examine the capacity of CBAs to engage local residents in 
employment opportunities, to foster community and environmental improvements, and to 
secure affordable housing through these legal agreements. The intent of this study is to assess 
the impact and to evaluate CBAs to ensure best practices for future urban planning initiatives 
and for promoting equitable development. As new policies emerge that accelerate 
development, increase displacement, and prioritize land as a commodity, it is critical to look 
for community solutions to ensure that marginalized communities’ voices are heard. My 
intention for completing this research study is to engage in potential solutions to address the 
gap that exists within Urban Planning surrounding the lack of community involvement in 
large-scale development projects. Drawing from six case studies within North America, this 
paper provides an overview on how to make CBAs feasible within Toronto. My findings 
suggest that while CBAs can generate significant reinvestment for communities they are not 
applicable for every new development, require well-defined targets, monitoring, and 
evaluation by all stakeholders for effective implementation. 




When I began the Masters of Environmental Studies Planning (MES) program I sought to 
better understand the processes of participatory planning within neighbourhoods. Throughout 
my studies, I learned about land trusts, co-ops, community benefits, as well as active 
community organizations that were advocates for equitable planning. In my trip to New York in 
my Critical Urban Planning Workshop, 10 other graduate students and I had visited community 
gardens, activist spaces, land trusts, and affordable and commodified housing developments. 
Through this trip, I learned about community benefit agreements by visiting the Atlantic Yards/
Pacific Park redevelopment. Additionally, I became aware about the injustices that 
marginalized residents faced during the redevelopment while watching the documentary “Battle 
for Brooklyn.” 
This led me to articulate ideas about how the planning process can be more equitable and 
inclusive to residents. Furthermore, I became interested in learning about how community 
wealth and power could be generated so that money from large development projects could be 
invested within local economies for neighbourhood improvements. My supervisor suggested 
community benefit agreements as a research topic for my major paper. Through conducting this 
research study, I was able to gain a deeper theoretical understanding of my areas of 
concentration of community development, gentrification, and participatory planning processes. 
As a result, this major paper includes a critical assessment of community benefit agreements 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
My intention for completing this research study is to understand and evaluate principles of “good 
planning,” and to better understand the decision-making powers within the planning process. Due 
to community concerns over the impacts of mega-projects, community benefit agreements have 
recently emerged as a tool to bring reinvestment back into the community and to allow for more 
equitable planning processes (Gross et al., 2015). It is argued that community benefit agreements 
are one of the most successful ways in which low-income communities can challenge growth 
regimes in a neoliberal society (Saito, 2020, p. 147). What I aim to discover through this research 
study includes investigating CBAs within the context of US & Canada and their implications for 
urban land development. This research study adopts a multi-scalar approach. This paper serves as a 
guidebook for understanding community power and to inspire neighbourhood outreach to address 
local concerns and promote equitable planning processes. Drawing from six case studies from a 
North American context, through a community development perspective, this paper assesses CBAs 
as a tool to ensure accountability, equitable planning, and re-investment into the community. 
Community Benefit Agreements ensure accountability within the development process by 
mitigating negative impacts such as gentrification and displacement to bring positive outcomes to 
affected communities. This study focuses on equitable planning. Community benefit agreements 
are seen as part of a larger movement for securing social benefits for neighbourhoods. CBAs along 
with CLTs, Co-ops, and Inclusionary Zoning are some of the tools in which investments from 
large-scale infrastructure projects can be redistributed back into the community.
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CBAs: Definition, Research Question, and Findings 
Community Benefits Agreements (CBAs) are legal agreements that are negotiated between 
community coalitions, developers, and/or public institutions (Gross et. al, 2008). Community 
Benefit Agreements are incorporated within large-scale development projects that can be used 
to achieve value-conscious growth (Cain, 2014, p. 934). CBAs are primarily used to promote 
the common good and to support planning initiatives. The common good can be described as 
economic (employment/financial), social (the hiring of certain groups), and/or environmental 
{air quality/green space/conservation (Baxamusa, 2008, p. 263)}. Through a comparative 
analysis of case studies within the USA and Canada, this research study aims to define how 
community benefits differ based on context, and how these examples offer opportunities for 
implementation within Toronto. My argument is that CBAs have the potential to influence and 
create equitable planning practices and to foster community engagement. My research question 
is therefore, “Through the analysis of case studies within US & Canada, how can 
community benefit agreements contribute to the common good and promote equitable 
planning practices? How do community benefit agreements differ in these contexts and 
how do we define their successes, challenges, and limitations to offer opportunities for 
implementation within Toronto?” My findings suggest that community benefit agreements 
have the capacity to redistribute wealth into local economies and prevent socio-spatial 
segregation. However, CBAs are not feasible for every new development and should be 
prioritized in neighbourhoods that have significant community needs such as Toronto’s Priority 
Neighbourhoods. Moreover, the success of a CBA is directly related to the effectiveness of 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. 
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Hence, mechanisms such as an oversight committee, penalties for noncompliance, and active 
enforcement by public officials should be included within all signed community benefit 
agreements. 
Literature Review 
Community Benefit Agreements (CBAs) are presented as “empowerment model that combines 
substantive negotiation, coalition building, and grassroots organizing (Baxamusa, 2008, p. 261).” 
Community benefits are related to community organizing efforts and are often facilitated by 
coalition building among grassroots organizations (Mizrahi and Rosenthal, 1993). The 
implications of community benefit agreements are that they give historically disadvantaged 
individuals the opportunity to participate in the planning process (p.60). As a result, CBAs seek 
to empower communities by challenging the traditional role that planners have played in the 
development process and can be used to bring equitable outcomes from a development to a 
community through engagement, negotiation, and reform-based solutions (Baxamusa, 2008). 
This literature review suggests that through citizen empowerment, community benefit 
agreements can drive social transformation (Maton, 2000). My results are supported by a 
literature review of gentrification, community development, and participatory planning 
perspectives. 
Gentrification within Toronto 
Hulchanski’s “Three Cities Within Toronto,” theory describes the socio-spatial segregation of 
neighbourhoods and the rise of three distinct cities within Toronto from 1970-2005. 
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City #1 consists of predominantly high-income areas where incomes have risen relative to the 
Toronto Census Metropolitan Area (CMA). City #2 consists of middle-income neighbourhoods 
where neighbourhood incomes have remained close to the CMA average since 1970. Lastly, City 
#3 consists of low-income areas where the income has fallen over the past few decades compared 
to the CMA average and incomes have fallen significantly (p. 1). The relevance of this article to 
CBAs is that this study addresses the socio-economic divide in Toronto’s neighbourhoods by 
census tract and informs how the government can redistribute this wealth through the use of 
community benefit agreements. The socio-spatial polarization described by Hulchanski is caused 
by gentrification. This term is defined as the “transformation of areas with relatively high levels 
of affordable housing into middle and high-income uses (Hackworth and Smith, 2002).” This 
phenomenon in Toronto’s neighbourhoods and is actively raising land values and transforming 
neighbourhoods. The article “The Changing State of Gentrification,” describes state-led 
gentrification and revitalization as a method for generating revenues. Additionally, Thurber & 
Christiano (2019) add that patterns of gentrification are not only income-based but have 
implications for gender, age, and class. Lipsitz (2007) states that neighbourhoods of colour are 
particularly vulnerable to gentrification through historic policies and practices that segregate, 
contain or exploit and/or remove people of colour (p. 12). McLean, Rankin, and Kamaizaki 
(2014) describe the long history of spatial inequalities as high- wage earners tended to live 
downtown while low-wage under employed service workers lived in the inner suburbs (p. 1287). 
The study was conducted in suburban Toronto’s Mount Dennis neighbourhood where active 
revitalization was occurring through Metrolinx’s Eglinton Crosstown construction. 
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In this area, 55% of the population is foreign-born and has the lowest household incomes in 
Toronto (p. 1287. This neighbourhood was designated as a priority neighbourhood due to its 
low-income status, lack of services, and rising crime rate. Furthermore, it was identified that, 
“often the most marginalized and racialized inhabitants of the city are the most vulnerable to 
displacement in gentrification processes (p. 1289.” Hence, it is evident that there are structural 
inequalities and racialization processes that systemically disadvantage low-income individuals 
(p. 1296. Therefore, the visions of marginalized individuals must be included within the 
planning process to ensure equity and transparency. 
Community development and citizen empowerment 
The planning process can be described as political and emphasizes the redistribution of power 
(Douglas and Friedmann, 1998. Logan and Molotch (1987 describe the city operating as a 
“growth machine,” where business interests particularly those in property investment, 
development, and real- estate finance dominate and are one of the most entrenched powers in the 
city. The theory assumes that a city’s growth is controlled by an elite group that has land-based 
interests in the manipulation of land to increase property values and benefit from the proceeds of 
urban growth. In particular, the use of “growth politics” and the rise of an “anti-growth 
coalitions” often result in response to new developments (Logan and Molotch, 1987. Molotch 
suggests that the rise of anti-growth movements within areas can influence improvement in state 
politics (p. 328). Fung and Wright (2003) describe the phenomena of “countervailing power,” as 
a variety of  mechanisms that reduce or neutralize the power advantages of normally powerful 
actors and decision-makers (p. 263). 
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Hence, community benefit agreements can be used to empower normally weak or disadvantaged 
groups. The community benefits movement is most closely tied with Lefebvre’s theoretical 
framework on the “right to the city,” and “autogestion.” Lefebvre’s vision for an equitable 
planning process is described where “users manage urban spaces for themselves beyond the 
control of the state and capitalism (p. 141).” Purcell argues that “the right to the city,” refers to 
wider political movements and revolutionary change regarding re-imagining urban space. It is 
asserted that the production of space is created based on the needs of property owners and through 
capitalism, which regulates and commodifies urban space (p. 149). Furthermore, the idea of 
“autogestion,” is discussed where decision- making is made by individuals within grassroots 
communities rather than by state officials (p. 147). Through autogestion, community power 
develops as individuals realize their power and become capable of managing personal affairs that 
in turn require less institutional control. Hence, through meaningful engagement with residents, 
social connections can be made and urban spaces can be redesigned. Through community benefit 
agreements, residents can reclaim spaces in the city by negotiating use-values over exchange-
values and shaping the spaces that they inhabit alongside city officials and developers. 
Participatory Planning and Governance 
Community benefit agreements create new models for participation and empowerment within the 
traditional planning process. Theorists emphasize the role of participatory processes in transforming 
power relations. In order to make community participation more meaningful, the community should 
participate and be part of the negotiation process within a new development (Baxamusa, 2008). 
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Smith’s Theoretical Basis for Participatory 
Planning argues, “Participatory planning 
increases the effectiveness and 
adaptability of the planning process 
through a “strengthening of the 
definition and role of communities 
within the urban system (p. 275).” 
It is stated that citizen participation remains outside of the planning process and has not been 
structured in a way to allow the positive inclusion of citizen inputs. As a result, two models for 
planning has emerged-one of pure hierarchy and the other of a more inclusive reticular 
structure (see Figure 1) that allows inputs from citizens in the planning and managing their 
communities (p. 276). In terms of participatory governance, “deliberative democracy,” 
describes that within the participatory planning process, there must be authentic deliberation 
and interactive engagement by associated interest groups to reach a consensus (Fung and 
Wright, 2001). Participatory collaboration is a form of governance that involves delegation of 
power from higher to lower levels of governance and applies to a wide range of stakeholders 
(p. 265). The benefits of participation and collaboration only result from processes that are 
inclusive, fair, and free from domination. Asymmetric or unequal power relations exist within 
these participatory planning regimes due to varying capabilities, the concentration of interests, 
and/or differences in knowledge or experience. This asymmetry in power relations has the 
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potential to exclude others due to differences. As a result, fair and equitable collaboration can 
be difficult to achieve. Hence, balancing community group and development interests can 
assist in creating conditions for fair collaboration (p. 266). Planning as a practice does not 
much regard for the outcomes of development such as gentrification and impacts on the local 
community. Therefore, CBAs can restructure this process by including historically 
disadvantaged groups into the narrative by providing social benefits. Social benefits such as 
employment, affordable housing, environmental, and community improvements can balance 
negative outcomes of a land development, and bring about investment and power back into 
these communities (Gross et. al, 2008). 
Methods 
My research method involves examining current developments within North America and 
assessing community benefit agreements (CBAs) by offering criticisms and making further 
recommendations regarding these projects. This will be done through a literature review of 
academic articles, news reports, and the examination of various legal documents. The legal 
documents that are critical to securing community benefits include: development agreements 
(DA), community benefit agreements (CBAs), and/or memorandums of understanding 
(MOU). Through the investigation of these ongoing Community Benefit Agreement case 
studies within the research paper, I will assess how CBAs integrate community concerns 
within the development process. I will evaluate CBA’s opportunities and limitations for 
providing: employment opportunities, community and environmental improvements, and 
affordable housing. 
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In Chapters 3 and 4, I will assess the success and validity Community Benefit 
Agreements. To analyze the data I will utilize four key criteria to evaluate the validity 
of CBAs identified by scholar Gross (2008). This includes considering 1) if CBAs 
involve a single development project, 2) if they are part of a legally-binding contract, 
3) if they include a range of community interests, and 4) if they are the product of
substantial community involvement (pp. 39-40). 
Within the introduction: Chapter 1, I will introduce my research questions and 
methodology. In Chapter 2, I will outline the history of Community Benefit 
Agreements in the US & Canada. In Chapter 3, I will use comparative analysis 
through the case study approach to analyze the STAPLES CBA (LA), Atlantic Yards 
CBA (NYC), and West Harlem Expansion CBA (NYC). In Chapter 4, I will analyze 
the Olympic Village CBA (BC), the Rexdale-Casino Woodbine CBA (TO), and the 
Metrolinx Eglinton Crosstown CBA (TO). Lastly, in Chapter 5, I present the results of 
a total of 10 semi-structured telephone interviews with a variety of stakeholders 
involved in the CBA process in Toronto. Participants included community organizers, 
researchers, consultants, TCBN members, urban planners, legal assistants, and 
academic scholars. My findings from the interviews will be incorporated within the 
beginning of the section. In the final analysis of the case studies, I will evaluate, 
analyze, and assess the lessons learned from undertaking this research study. This 
includes: assessing CBAs effectiveness in implementation, as a mechanism of building 
community power and wealth, and their implication for shaping future public policies. 
Hence, the components that I will focus on within the analysis include: examining the 
implementation of CBAs in different contexts within the USA and Canada,
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community assessment of these policies on the ground level and to offer future 
policy recommendations.  
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Chapter 2: The History of CBAs in North America 
CBAs: Definitions and Typology 
It has been stated that community benefit agreements are one of the most powerful tools that 
community groups can leverage to shape development projects (Musil, 2012, p. 827). This can 
be done through leveraging public subsidies, organizing the community through sustained 
campaigns, and negotiating the community benefits of a proposed planning development 
before final city approval and construction begins (Dowlin, 2019). Community Benefit 
Agreements are tools for providing equity for community groups impacted by large-scale 
development projects. The “benefits,” that a community can receive include: jobs, training, 
community amenities, parkland, affordable housing, and public art (Gross, 2008). There are 
three types of community benefit agreements: public, private, and hybrid (Graser, 2016, pp. 
5). Private CBAs are contracts that are signed between a developer and a community group or 
coalition. These tend to be created through community need or initiative. Public CBAs are 
contracts signed between a government or government agency and a community group or 
coalition. The government in this case, acts as the developer or builds the infrastructure. 
Hybrid CBAs are multi- party agreements. The stakeholders include: a developer, government 
agency, and usually one or more community groups that are parties to the agreement (Graser, 
2016). Community Benefit Agreements have been used in mega-projects in the past, however 
they also have the capacity to be used within smaller-scale projects. Citizen involvement and 
decision- making in land use planning is controversial and debated. Community Benefit 
Agreements have enhanced the role of citizen participation in economic development 
decision-making through the involvement of organizations, labour unions, and CBA advocacy 
groups (Salkin & Lavine, 2008). Within these legally binding contracts between developers 
and CBA coalitions, CBAs establish a process for including community objectives as part of a 
development (Larsen, 2009, p. 2).
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 Once the community benefits are negotiated, the developers apply monitoring, review, and 
approval processes (Musil, 2012, p. 829). Although CBAs are outside of the traditional realm of 
obtaining land development approvals from government bodies, this new process for land 
development allows community groups to engage in negotiations with developers regarding 
community amenities (Leroy & Purinton, 2005). In the following section, I will outline the 
origins, history and development of community development agreements within the North-
American context.
The origins- IBAs (Impact and Benefit Agreements) 
The origin of creating community benefit agreements originally began in indigenous 
communities through the Northern Community Impact Benefit Agreement (NCIBA). This 
agreement in exchange for indigenous land shows the colonialist practices of land developers 
long before modern mega-projects emerged. These agreements were created to mitigate adverse 
impacts of developments. Similar to CBAs, an IBA (Impact and Benefit Agreements) is a legally 
binding agreement that is developed through a consultation and negotiation process with the 
affected indigenous groups. These agreements outline any negative impacts that may result from 
the exploitation of the resource (usually mining), mitigation efforts, and how the indigenous 
community will benefit with respect to employment, economic development, or other aspects 
(Gibson & O’Faircheallaigh, 2015). Furthermore, similar to CBAs, communities negotiate 
directly with the developer in order to meet community needs and can decide whether the project 
meets community needs and have the right to refuse negotiations if the needs are not met 
(Gibson & O’Faircheallaigh, 2015, .p. 11).
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 Through an analysis of IBA case studies in Nunavut, a mandatory aspect of the Nunavut Land 
Claims Agreement, it was found that the distribution of decision-making process were unequal 
and interests of governmental, and regional actors were favored over local community, 
environmental, and other non- governmental groups (Hitch, 2006). Hence, through this analysis 
it can be understood that the relationships and decision- making powers that coexist in signing 
legal agreements between the governmental actors and local community are inherently uneven 
due to status, authority, and governance principles (Rogers & Murphy, 2015, p. 44). It is 
evident that agreements for the provision of community benefits have been used as part of a 
routine development process for decades through “the limited mitigation of development 
impacts,” in renewable energy, mining industry, major industrial, retail, and residential 
developments (Campbell et al., 2000). Only recently, has there been a shift of the provision of 
“hard,” to “soft,” infrastructure services such as civic amenities, employment public art, 
training, and open space within development projects as benefits allocated to the local 
communities (Campbell et al., 2000, p. 766). 
The Emergence of CBAs in the USA 
The emergence of CBAs began due to changes in the political and urban development process 
during the last five decades that can be attributed to promoting a capitalist growth machine 
agenda to cut public spending costs and promote public-private partnerships. First, in 1970, 
federal and state governments began creating new methods for non-governmental organizations 
to become part of the development process (Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003, pp. 230-234). Under 
these new policy changes, non- governmental organizations were able to file lawsuits against 
impacts of public-private redevelopments that could potentially delay or stop the construction 
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of a development project (Marantz, 2015, p. 5). Next, in the late 1970s reductions in federal aid 
and reduction in property taxes inspired cities to partake in deals with private developers 
through the emergence of public-private partnerships through a Neoliberalist agenda (Sagalyn, 
1990). Through these partnerships, planning obligations were “a vehicle through which 
development- related infrastructure and service provision could be funded (Campbell et al., 
2000, p. 760.” Lastly, in the mid-1990s labour advocacy organizations criticized public-private 
partnerships as a form of invisible public spending that was responsible for creating low-wage 
jobs and limited economic mobility (Cummings, 2017, pp. 1944-1945. Due to these political 
changes, there was a community benefits movement that began in the U.S.A as organizing 
campaigns emerged to advocate for equity, and social justice (Gross et al., 2015. These 
campaigns enabled public officials, labour representatives and community organizers to 
collaborate and negotiate community concerns. As a result, CBA Agreements emerged in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s in urban redevelopment projects within the USA (Wolf-Powers, 
2010, p. 141. CBAs in the USA were in the form of public- private partnerships to achieve 
equitable outcomes from local development projects (Wolf-Powers, 2010, p. 141. Local 
governments supported this as part of a pro- growth agenda where cities and states were often 
granted tax exemption and public subsidies for developers to allow cities to prosper (Galley, 
2015. Currently, there are over 50 CBAs implemented within large-scale developments in the 
United States (Salkin and Lavine, 2008. Within mass projects, there are mass opportunities to 
secure benefits. Many of the negotiations involve provisions for living wages, first source 
hiring programs, low-income housing, and minority hiring promises (Salkin, 2007. Based on 
the observations made, the CBAs tend to cluster around cities where the most growth and 
redevelopment were occurring including: South California, San Francisco Bay area, and 
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New York City (Wolf-Powers, 2010). 
Contrary to popular belief, the first CBA that emerged in the USA was the Hollywood & 
Highland Center CBA in 1998 advocated by the community group LA Alliance for New 
Economy (LAANE). This private community benefit agreement involved construction of a 
large retail and entertainment district at the intersection of Hollywood Boulevard and 
Highland Avenue in Los Angeles California (Larsen, 2009, pp. 3-4). The $388 million dollar 
project included the construction of the Kodak Theatre, a movie theatre, parking lots, hotels, 
and 1.2 million square feet of retail (Salkin & Lavine, 2008, pp. 301). The project was 
successful as 70% of the employees were local hires and half of the permanent positions 
provided living wages (Grady & Leroy, 2006). Furthermore, this CBA inspired another CBA 
by LANNE across the street at Hollywood and Vine for a mixed-use transit oriented 
development in 2004 with a living wage, affordable housing, and job training opportunities 
(Salkin & Lavine, 2008, pp. 301-302). However, the Hollywood and Highland CBA is 
argued as not a fully-fledged CBA due to its incorporation into the overall development 
agreement and its involvement of council members in the negotiation process (Salkin & 
Lavine, 2008, pp. 301). For these reasons, it is often credited that the Staples Centre was the 
first genuine CBA agreement. The STAPLES Centre CBA (2001) serves as a model for 
future CBAs in many cities worldwide (Been, 2010, p. 3). This CBA is one of the most 
comprehensive CBAs to date and includes reporting requirements, a monitoring committee, 
and is legally binding, as it is enforceable by the city as well as community groups. This 
CBA was negotiated during the construction of the Staples Centre, a sports arena built for 
the Los Angeles Lakers (Salkin & Lavine, 2008, pp. 302- 303). This case study will be 
explored further in the next chapter.
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The Emergence of CBAs in the Canada 
The first CBA developed in Canada was for redevelopment of Toronto’s Regent Park 
Neighborhood. This revitalization project took place in one of Toronto’s oldest public 
housing developments (Galley, 2015). There was significant criticism that arose from this 
development to the extent residents were engaged in the discussions and negotiations 
(Olatoye, Ong et al., 2019, p. 4). Moreover, critics suggest that the Vancouver Olympic 
Village was the first CBA as it was one of the most successful CBAs in Canada (Atkinson 
Foundation, 2016). This community benefit agreement was negotiated by three levels of 
government and included provisions for job training, environmental and community 
improvements and affordable housing. Furthermore, it is stated that this CBA may have 
influenced the creation of the CBA policy that came afterwards (Olatoye, Ong et al., 2019, 
p. 8). British Columbia became the first province to develop a CBA policy that guides all
social procurement, and infrastructure in the province in practice. The policy was enacted 
in order to reduce poverty, as a quarter of Vancouver’s residents are in the low-income 
measure, with the second highest income gap of any Canadian city (Olatoye, Ong et al., 
2019, p. 7). The purpose of the policy is to ensure that that development brings 
improvement to people’s quality of life and redistribute wealth into the community through 
local hiring and social procurement (City of Vancouver, 2017). The CBA policy was 
introduced in 2018 for key public sector projects and focused on maximizing 
apprenticeship opportunities for major projects, increasing membership in unions, creating 
opportunities for employment and lastly, for skill development for indigenous people and 
women (City of Vancouver, 2017). 
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Furthermore, in Toronto, the community benefits movement arose from the development 
of the council approved Community Benefits Framework on June 11, 2019 that arose as 
initiative from existing policy frameworks including the Social Procurement Policy and 
the Poverty Reduction Strategy (City of Toronto, 2019a). Since then, communities and 
organizations such as Parkdale People’s Economy, Toronto Community Housing, and 
Metrolinx have created their own community benefit frameworks to govern and oversee 
these processes. In 2013, the Toronto Community Benefits Network (TCBN) was created 
as an third-party oversight committee directly involved the process of securing 
community benefits within Toronto. Since then, this coalition has partnered with over 85 
community and labour organizations, social enterprises, as well as anchor institutions and 
government officials (TCBN, 2020). TCBN’s five commitments include securing: 1) 
construction and trades jobs and opportunities, 2) professional administrative and 
technical jobs, 3) local and diverse-owned businesses, 4) community oversight, and 5) 
neighbourhood and environmental improvements within major development projects in 
Toronto (Participant 3, Personal Communication, 04/24/20). Following this CBA, 
subsequently other CBAs became developed in Toronto alongside TCBN including 
Eglinton Light Rail Transit, and the Woodbine Casino. Further discussions on these case 
studies will be explored in Chapter 4: CBA Case Studies in Canada. 
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Chapter 3: CBA Case Studies in USA 
Through comparative analysis of the three USA case studies I will assess their successes 
and challenges by evaluating their mandates for providing: 1) employment 
opportunities, 2) community & environmental impacts, and 3) affordable housing within 
each community benefit agreement. The three case studies that will be analyzed in this 
chapter include: the Staples Center, Atlantic Yards, and the West Harlem Expansion 
community benefit agreements. The following case studies will be examined through the 
Growth Machine approach. This approach describes cities as growth machines with unified 
and powerful growth coalitions that pursue a pro-growth agenda (Cain, 2014). In the 
context of the US most of these developments were large- scale and required major public 
subsidies from government entities. 
Case study #1: STAPLES CENTER (LA) 
Table 1: List of key actors in the STAPLES Centre Redevelopment 
Key Actor Description 
Anschutz Entertainment Group (AEG) Developer 
Figueroa Corridor Coalition for 
Economic Justice (FCCEJ) 
Community coalition negotiating 
directly with the developer (a local 
coalition of 29 community groups and 
five labour unions) 
Alex Padilla (City Council President) 
Bernard Parks (Chairman of Council’s 
Budget and Finance Committee). 
Governmental agencies involved with the 
project 




The STAPLES centre was part of a larger growth machine 
agenda to build the third-largest hotel and a Convention 
Centre to put the city on a global scale (Vincent & 
McGreevy, 2014). The Staples Centre is one of the largest 
economic projects build in downtown Los Angeles 
spanning a total of 27 acres (Saito & Truong, 2015). The 
city of Los Angeles and the company’s goal was to attract 
tourists through attractions such as shops, restaurants, 
and an entertainment complex (Vincent & McGreevy, 
2014). This development would enable a major 
economic stimulus to the area. The project includes the 
development of two major hotels, plazas for entertainment, retail and restaurants, a convention centre 
expansion, 7,000-seat theatre, luxury condominiums, an office tower, housing, and a 45- storey sports 
complex (Olatoye, Ong et al., 2019, p. 5). This project was supported through an estimated $150 
million in public subsidies through the use of eminent domain (Gross, LeRoy, & Janis-Aparicio, 
2005, p.113-114). This proposed development would take place among one of the poorest census 
tracts in the city of Los Angeles (Marantz, 2015, p.8). This CBA involved a $4.2 billion LA Sports 
and Entertainment District development that was negotiated directly with the Figueroa Corridor 
Coalition for Economic Justice (FCCEJ), a local coalition of 29 community groups and five labour 
unions (Gross, LeRoy, & Janis-Aparicio, 2005, p.115). The project was completed in 2010, and it 
was thought to have “catalyzed a national movement (Saito & Truong, 2015).” As a result of this 
project, several other CBAs were modeled after this agreement and increased awareness of the 
benefits of CBAs through the creation of an equitable development policy (Olatoye, Ong et al., 2019, 
p. 5).
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 The major players involved in this development included: Anschutz Entertainment Group 
(AEG) as the developer, Figueroa Corridor Coalition for Economic Justice (FCCEJ) as the 
representative coalitions involved in community benefits negotiations, City Council members 
Alex Padilla and Bernard Parks that advocated for community involvement as the corporate 
sponsors for the entertainment complex. 
STAPLES CBA Project Targets 
Table 2: Project targets within the STAPLES CBA. Key targets sorted by: 1) 
employment opportunities, 2) community and environmental improvements, 3) 
affordable housing. 
1) Employment Opportunities ● 70% of the estimated 5,500
permanent jobs to pay a living
wage or higher.
● A total of $100,000 in funding for a
local hiring and job training
program to those displaced, living
within a three miles radius of the
project, or living in low-income
areas across the city.
2) Community and Environmental
Improvements 
● A commitment of more than $1
million for the improvement or
creation of parks within a mile radius
of the project through community
input.
● A residential parking program that is
to be financed by developers for five
years that will reserve street parking
for residents
3) Affordable Housing ● The construction of between 100-
160 affordable housing units, part of
20% of the final project. The units
will be affordable to those earning
below 50%, 60% and 80% of the
area’s median income.
● Developers will provide up to
$65,000 in interest-free loans for
non-profit housing developers in the
early phases of project development
within the area.
21 
The CBA Process 
On May 3, 2000 the owners of the STAPLES centre announced a plan to transform the property 
into a master- planned community with retail, entertainment, hotel, office, and residential zones 
(Newton, 2000). Shortly after the developer’s announcement, in 2001, a coalition was formed in 
response to the community concerns regarding the Staples Center project (Saito & Truong, 2015). 
The main concerns included increased noise, traffic congestion and loss of homes from the 
development and an increase in poverty and unemployment in the already low-income community 
(Olatoye, Ong et al., 2019). As a result, the Figuera Coalition was formed and included more than 
30 community, environmental, labour, social-service, and faith-based groups (Saito & Truong, 
2015). The residents who negotiated this CBA consisted of low-income minority populations and 
immigrants, and through the negotiation process, the developer gained support from service unions 
and community organizations (Olatoye, Ong et al., 2019, p. 6). The negotiated CBA included a 
first source-hiring program, living wage requirements for 70% of project jobs, an inclusion of 
affordable housing units, parks and recreation investments, and legal services for tenants 
(Atkinson Foundation, 2016, pp. 3-4). Furthermore, coalition representatives were to meet with 
prospective tenants, to produce annual reports to the city, and comply with the city’s living wage 
law to ensure accountability and active monitoring of this CBA (Marantz, 2015, p. 11). 
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Gross’s Four Criteria Checklist 
Table 3: The following checklist is used to evaluate the STAPLES Centre CBA. 
It includes Gross’s four criteria which determine the validity of a community 
benefit agreement 
Criteria Y N 
1) They involve a single development X 
2) They are a legally-binding contract X 
3) They address a range of community interests X 
4) They are a product of substantial community
involvement
X 
CBA Evaluation: Successes, Challenges & Opportunities for Improvement 
Based on Gross’s Four Criteria Checklist, this CBA meets the requirements for validity and 
can be used as a blueprint for future similar projects. The Los Angeles Sports & Entertainment 
District is a model for future CBA agreements because it is one of the first successful CBAs in 
the USA and it clearly outlines the targets for hiring, goals for affordable housing, parks and 
recreation facilities (Marantz, 2015, pp. 252). The Figueroa Coalition that was created and the 
success of this project has inspired other significant CBAs and creation of legislation in Los 
Angeles (Atkinson Foundation, 2016, p. 4). This private CBA is unique as the development 
agreement takes community concerns into account and includes input made by community, 
environmental and labour groups (Romney, 2001, para. 1). The STAPLES CBA was 
enormously successful in negotiating and implementing community benefits. 
The project successes included creating an in-depth examination and monitoring of the results 
of the CBA’s provisions including affordable housing and local hiring (Saito & Truong, 2015, 
p. 263). The main criticisms of the development are that the developer and politicians were
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pursuing a pro-growth agenda by funding a sports center development through the use of 
eminent domain. Through incorporating the CBA, the developer gained community support 
leading to faster approvals of the project, removal of litigation costs, and project delays 
(Olatoye, Ong et al., 2019). However, through strong advocacy and support for the 
community, the CBA was able to appease both sides by bringing about benefits to residents 
and profits to the developers (Saito & Troung, 2015). Parks and Warren (2009) describe that 
communities within Los Angeles involved in this process were able to “leverage the 
technocratic planning process to build political bargaining powers with developers and to 
articulate demands for community benefits (p. 96).” The opportunities for improvement are 
that some of the CBA requirements overlap with other contracts and may not be legally 
enforceable, and the living wage reports should be made available to the public to ensure 
accountability (Marantz, 2015, p. 3). However, this CBA demonstrates how community groups 
can ensure that developers enforce obligations, and shows how community groups can use a 
CBA to direct public funding to under-served neighbourhoods (Marantz, 2015). 
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Case Study #2 Atlantic Yards / Pacific Park 
Table 4: List of key actors in the Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park Redevelopment 
Key Actors Description 
Forest City Ratner (now Greenland Holdings) Developer 
Empire State Development 
Corporation MTA/Long Island Rail 
Yard 
The governmental organizations 
supporting the project 
Celebrities, Mayor Bloomberg Public spokespeople and 
supporters/stakeholders 
Develop Don’t Destroy Brooklyn 
(DDDB) Prospect Heights Action 
Coalition 
Resistance groups 
Brooklyn United for Innovative Local 
Development (BUILD) 
Association of Community Organization for 
Reform Now (ACORN) 
Brooklyn Oversight and Advisory 
Committee (DBOAC) 
Community Boards 2, 6, and 8 
Supporting groups 
History & Background 
It can be argued that the Atlantic Yards 
development was built using the 
mandate of growth machine politics 
through the strong support and 
influence by the government, Empire 
State Development Corporation, 
politicians, and the MTA which 
http://communitybenefits.blogspot.com/2008/01/atlantic- 
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strongly supported the development despite opposition. In the New York Post (2013), it states 
“Without government incentives, most of [Forest City Enterprises] development projects 
would not be economically viable.” Some of the supporters of the CBA agreement included 
Governor Pataki, House State Assembly speaker, Senate Majority leader Joseph Bruno, and 
Mayor Bloomberg (Been 2010, p. 9). The community group resisting the development 
Develop Don’t Destroy Brooklyn (DDDB) can be as an “anti-growth coalition,” in response 
to the development. Atlantic Yards is a public- private partnership made between Forest City 
Ratner (now Greenland Holdings) and the Empire State Development Corporation. A public- 
private partnership is a partnership negotiated between a city representative and a developer. 
These partnerships bypass the traditional planning land use procedure and do not involve 
significant public participation (Musil, 2012, p. 841). 
As this mega project spans 22-acres, Atlantic Yards is one of the largest redevelopment 
projects in New York City’s history (Metrofocus, 2011). This five-billion dollar development 
in Prospect Heights was proposed in 2003, but due to lawsuits and a recession, it was 
postponed and re-approved in 2009. The Master Plan includes the Barclays arena, a hotel, 15 
buildings with zoning for housing, retail, office space, and 8 acres of open space (Pacific Park 
Brooklyn, 2020). There is a proposal for a total of 6,400 residential units to be built including 
2,250 affordable housing units (City Limits, 2011). Within this development and community 
benefit agreement there was a lot of controversies and strong opposition against 
theagreement. Eight organizations signed the CBA but over 50 organizations representing 
Brooklyn residents signed a petition against the project due to adverse community impacts 
(Partnership for Working Families, 2016, p.11). The major players within this case study 
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included: the developer [Forest City Ratner which later became Greenland Holdings], the two 
opposing groups [Develop Don’t Destroy Brooklyn (DDDB) and Brooklyn United for 
Innovative Local Development (BUILD), politicians and celebrities praising the development 
[Mayor Bloomberg, Jay Z, etc.], and the Empire State Development and the Empire State 
Development and MTA were the governmental agencies supporting the project. 
Table 5: Project targets within the Atlantic Yards CBA. Key targets sorted by: 1) 




● 10,000 permanent jobs
● 35% Minority and 10% women construction workers
● Job training initiatives, referral and hiring (vague about
funding
details).
● Create a “Youth Enterprise program,” where developing
retail space will be operated by students, an after school
program, and a program




● Developers to award 20% of the total construction
sum to qualified minority firms, and 10% to qualified
women owned firms.
● Contribute to a community health centre, a senior citizens
centre, parks and open spaces, arena related programs.
● Develop four schools (4) located in the surrounding
community.
● Six-acres of open space with walkways, plazas,
terraces open to the public without charge (still in
construction phase).
● Within the arena:
-The developer designates particular seats for community
use with priority given to seniors and youth.
-The Arena will be available at a “reasonable rate,” for
community groups use at least 10 times a year.
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-The meditation room will be available for community use.
● Establish a foundation will “fund sports in disadvantaged
communities, support nonprofit organization, and special
initiatives to work with the prison population.”
● Establish a committee on environmental assurance to
address short and long term environmental issues and
report periodically to Coalition on mitigation measures
(not necessary as it is covered by NY environmental
impact statement & review process)
● Develop a “Good Neighbor Program,” providing
benefits forpublic housing residents by funding capital
improvements for recreation, libraries, and creating a
job readiness and referral centre.
● The CBA requires the developer to fund the appointment
of an “independent compliance monitor,” to oversee the
implementation of the agreement and investigate any
complaints about its implementation (the independent
compliance monitor was never hired.)
3) Affordable
Housing 
● 2,250 units of affordable housing (affordable
housing remains unfinished)
● 50% of the residential buildings built to low and
moderate-income families (however the funding was
not secured to support initiative).
The CBA Process 
The land development process began on March 3, 2005, the City and Empire State Development 
Corporation signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that gave the developer the power 
to take the land (some parcels owned by residents) through eminent domain and to overrule the 
existing Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (Been, 2010, p. 6). Eminent domain is the power 
of the government to take away a person’s private property to be used for the public good as 
long as there is just compensation (Walsh & McNamara, 2009). The development was justified 
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through the developer stating that the area was blighted and in need of urban renewal (Empire 
State Development, pp. 4-5). This project was supported through strong political support 
including a pro-growth agenda and the use of “growth politics,” through the use of eminent 
domain. This allowed Forest City Ratner to seize properties from 130 homeowners and for the 
53 remaining properties; they pressured the state to declare the private property as ‘blighted’, 
and seized the property under eminent domain. In October 2006, the resistance group DDDB 
filed lawsuits to challenge the state’s environmental impact findings of the ‘blighted’ properties 
and to stop the use of eminent domain, unfortunately, they lost both cases (Metrofocus, 2011). 
The main critiques were that many opponents view this project as a land grab where major 
injustices faced by the community since this redevelopment involved using eminent domain. 
Furthermore, the CBA was viewed as a method for silencing community advocates rather than 
empowering them. In this redevelopment, there were community groups that emerged that had 
not previously existed before (Beilinson, et al., 2011). Within the eight community groups 
involved in negotiating the CBA some accusations had conflicts of interest or were being 
handpicked by the developer (Salkin and Lavine, 2008, p. 310). This conflict of interest was 
further exacerbated through one of the community groups reported to receiving $5 million from 
the developer, and several chairpersons from local community boards playing an advisory role 
in the negotiations (The Observer, 2005, para. 4). Within the CBA and development proposal 
there were promises of many community benefits including 10,000 new jobs, 8-acres of open 
space, and 2,250 units of affordable housing (Empire State Development, pp. 4-5). Through 
further analysis, it was discovered that contrary to the proposal, most jobs were part-time, 
offered to EB- 5 candidates rather than to local hires, and there were about 20-127 construction 
workers onsite per day (Oder, 2016). Furthermore, open-space is limited and not open to the 
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public during the construction phase (Schwartz, 2019). In terms of the current affordable 
housing built on-site it was market-level rent costs and did not fulfill the promise of 50% of 
residential buildings being built for low-and moderate-income families due to a limited budget 
(Oder, 2014). Lastly, the independent compliance monitor was never hired to oversee the 
process (Oder, 2016).
Gross’s Four Criteria Checklist 
Table 6: The following checklist is used to evaluate the Atlantic Yards 
CBA. It includes Gross’s four criteria which determine the validity of a 
community benefit agreement. 
Criteria Y N 
1) They involve a single development X 
2) They are a legally-binding contract X 
3) They address a range of community interests X 
4) They are a product of substantial community
involvement
X 
CBA Evaluation: Successes, Challenges & Opportunities for Improvement 
Based on Gross’s four criteria checklist, this is an ineffective CBA and requires an 
opportunity for improvement. This evaluation is based on the CBA not representing all 
community interests and involving substantial community involvement. In the negotiation 
process, some community groups were welcome, while others such as Develop Don’t 
Destroy Brooklyn, did not get their voices or interests heard during the implementation of 
the CBA (Beilinson, et al., 2011). Furthermore, coalition building and inclusive 
community engagement were absent in this process (Graser, 2016, p. 9) Therefore this 
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CBA failed since it lacked transparency. A transparent and inclusive community engagement 
process is critical to the success of the CBA since it achieves credibility with the community 
(Graser, 2016, p. 9). Hence, this CBA served to disempower rather than empower the 
communities that were most impacted by the development (Partnership for Working Families, 
2016, p.10). Although the eight community-based groups signed the CBA contract on June 27, 
2005, with Mayor Bloomberg as the witness, the agreement was not legally binding since the 
MOU had eliminated the legal role of the community board as well as the common uniform land 
use review procedure, where the community board would hold a public hearing of the project 
(Been, 2010, p. 7). 
Atlantic Yards CBA Project Targets 
Moreover, the limitations of the CBAs were that most of the benefits that were proposed 
disappeared or were delayed to an unknown point (Rosenblum, 2013). Since there was no 
“independent compliance monitor,” hired there was no support or mechanism to ensure that the 
CBA fulfilled its promises and made the evaluation of the CBAs progress difficult and limited 
access to information about the project's impact on the community (Partnership for Working 
Families, 2016, p. 12). The opportunities for improvement are that Atlantic Yards CBA serves as 
a model for the need for community-led planning initiatives in the planning process. Some 
opportunities for improvement include ensuring effective community engagement through the 
full project process. Furthermore, the project targets within the CBA is “aspirational, vaguely 
described and are difficult to enforce (Partnership for Working Families, 2016, p.10).” Through 
my investigation of this case study, there was a lot of information that was not disclosed to the 
public during the development stages, and many community groups were not experienced to 
negotiate the CBA. 
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This resulted in a lot of conflict and project delays. Therefore, developers should provide full 
project details at each stage of the development to ensure transparency. Lastly, there needs to be 
an enforcement mechanism hired to oversee the process and to ensure the project benefits are 
fulfilled and reported back to the community (Graser, 2016).
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Case Study #3 West Harlem Expansion NYC 
Table 7: List of key actors in the West Harlem Expansion. 
Key Actor Description 
Columbia University Developer 
Empire State Development 
Corporation New York City’s 
Economic Development 
Corporation (EDC) 
The governmental organizations 
supporting the project 
West Harlem Local Development 
Corporation (WHLDC)-(includes 
9 elected officials, later 5 
resigned). 
Public spokespeople and 
supporters/stakeholders (including politicians) 
John Bickerman (mediator of 
WHLDC) Wachtel & Masyr LLP 
(counsel to WHLDC) 
Office of Corporation Counsel 
(offered legal advice to elected 
officials) 
Professional attorney/mediator during CBA 
negotiations 
Manhattan’s Community Board 9 
(CB9) 
Supporting group 
Coalition to Preserve Community 
(activists from a local group of 
Manhattanville expansion critics) 
Opposing group 
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History & Background 
This development proposal was for 
Columbia to expand its campus into West 
Harlem. This 17-acre project included a 
budget of $6.38 billion (Paul, 2010) and a 
timeline of 20-years for 16-18 new 
buildings with residential and commercial 
uses (Messina, 2007, para. 2). This 6- 
billion dollar project, like Atlantic Yards, 
is seen as part of growth machine politics 
as it was proposed to create 7,000 new 
jobs and was the CBA was strongly advocated by politicians such as Mayor Bloomberg, city 
council members, and state senate members (Salkin and Lavine, 2008, p. 314). This CBA has a 
long history of being a controversial project for over 40 years, through significant community 
opposition (Been, 2010, p. 14). As in the Atlantic Yards development, there was strong 
opposition to the use of eminent domain for this redevelopment project by the community 
(Messina, J., 2007, para. 6). Similar to Atlantic Yards, the findings of “blight,” where parts of 
West Harlem were deemed “substantially unsafe, unsanitary, substandard and deteriorated,” was 
used to justify the use of the eminent domain (Franzese, 2011, p. 1092). The development would 
displace an estimated 400 people, 1600 jobs, and rezone 35 acres (Angotti, 2006, para. 2). In 
both cases, the power of the government’s pro- growth policy the New York State Urban 
Development Corporation Act (UDCA), justified taking of private property if the property is 
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determined to have “blight,” or used in a manner to classify it as a “civic project (McKinney, 
2010).” The major players within this case study included Columbia University as the developer, 
the governmental entities Empire State Development Corporation, West Harlem Local 
Development Corporation (WHLDC), elected officials, professional attorneys, and Manhattan’s 
Community Board 9 as the supporting group, and the Coalition to Preserve Community as the 
opposing group. 
West Harlem Expansion CBA Project Targets 
Table 8: Project targets within the West Harlem Expansion CBA. Key targets sorted 





● The draft commits Columbia to pay a living wage to all
employees on the expanded campus
● A mandate to hire local residents and give contracts to
minority and women-owned businesses as well as





· Contribute an additional $11.5 million for local
parks and playgrounds, to use environmentally
friendly construction and design.
· To fund a resource center for the community
· Creation of a new public school
● To create a community resource center to
givelocal residents information about the
construction plans
● Fund an assessment of public transportation,
pedestrian and parking needs in the community.
● Pay for an assessment of community health needs.
● Develop and support a clinic that would provide legal
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services and housing advocacy for the local community 
(such as assisting local tenants in eviction 
proceedings). 
● Undertake environmental improvements.
● Provide a space for a daycare facility.
3) Affordable
Housing 
• A $24 million fund to build affordable housing
in the neighborhood and to provide funding and
services to those displaced by the development.
• Pay for improvements to public housing in the
area.
The CBA Process 
The land development process officially began in December 2007, when a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU), and rezoning approvals were signed between community groups 
(Amzallag, 2013, para. 5). The main critiques of this development project by the opposing 
group Coalition to Preserve Community was that it was an unsafe construction site, there were 
potential health hazards through the construction of the level 3 biohazard laboratory in the 
basement, the unjustified use of eminent domain to displace Harlem residents and businesses, 
and the promised jobs and training opportunities that had not yet appeared within the 
development (Stop Columbia, 2020). Another issue that arose was the lack of transparency 
and community participation. In an interview podcast on PBS in 2007, Columbia University 
president Bollinger stated that only 30% of the jobs would be filled by West Harlem residents 
(Kinniburgh, 2013). In the original project plan in 2003, the university initially promised an 
expansion would involve a collaborative partnership with the Harlem community (Paul, 
2010). However, community participation in this regard was limited due to the major 
stakeholders being the main decision- makers, and opposition and concerns from the 
community were not considered. On March 22, 2012, members of the Coalition to Preserve 
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Community, St. Mary’s Congregations for Justice and Peace, Harlem community members 
and students from Columbia University marched against Columbia’s expansion plans (Stop 
Columbia, 2020). However, no efforts were made by Columbia for reconciliation and to 
develop a partnership with the surrounding community consisting of low-income, people of 
colour (Paul, 2010). 
In an attempt to create a more equitable alternative to the development, the 
community drafted a plan called the “197-a planning process.” This document sought 
to address the project’s community concerns and achieve redevelopment without the 
use of eminent domain and avoid displacement (Angotti, 2006). It was named after 
the section of the City Charter (1989) that allows New York’s 59 community boards 
to compose plans for adoption by the City Planning Commission and City Council 
(Paul, 2010, p 2). Columbia University, however, refused to take this document into 
account and continued with its original project plan. It can be argued that there was a 
strong pro-growth agenda by government entities and Columbia University chairs that 
advocated for the expansion plans as contributing to a “world-class research 
university.” The city council acted in Columbia's favour when in December 2007, it 
approved both CB9’s 197 plan and Columbia University’s rezoning. Through granting 
this approval, it rendered the 197-a invalid through the interpretation of the plans as 
policy guidelines rather than law precedents. The rezoning, on the other hand, was a 
force of law (Paul, 2010). Again in December 2008, the Empire State Development 
Corporation (ESDC), the state’s economic development body acted in Columbia’s 
best interests when it approved the use of eminent domain although there was significant 
opposition and lawsuits with property owners.  
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To conclude, through the pursuit of a pro-growth agenda and the characterization of the West 
Harlem expansion as a growth machine, presents the unjust narrative of land dominance by 
developers and governmental entities to justify displacement. Molotch (1976) explains that 
often local universities advocate for growth to increase their local population to sustain its 
expansion plans (p. 317). The university’s pro- growth agenda can be explained through the 
Coalition to Preserve Community statement that “Columbia created an image of engagement 
and their dialogue was not of substance. For years they worked behind the scenes to push their 
agenda. They pressured business owners to sell and the city’s housing agency to get rid of 
tenants (Angotti, 2006, para. 15).” The City Planning Commission told both parties to “enter 
into a dialogue and make good faith efforts to achieve consensus (Angotti, 2006, para. 10.)” 
As a result, the West Harlem CBA was signed in May 2009 and promised $150 million worth 
of community benefits including $30 million for a university-run public school, $20 million 
for in- kind services, and $24 million for an affordable housing fund, however an 
undetermined sum of $76 million was set aside to be implemented for the next twelve years 
(Williams and Rivera, 2007, para. 30). The funds were to be distributed over 16 years to 
provide payment for a public housing area, a new public school, a resource centre for the 
community, public transit, pedestrian and parking, a legal services clinic, and a housing 
advocacy for the local community. (Been, 2010 p. 19). Furthermore, within the CBA there 
was a commitment for a living wage to all employees on campus, to hire residents, minorities, 
women-owned businesses, environmental improvements, and provide a space for a daycare 
facility (West Harlem Community Benefits Agreement, 2009). 
38 
Gross’s Four Criteria Checklist 
Table 9: The following checklist is used to evaluate the West Harlem 
Expansion CBA. It includes Gross’s four criteria which determine the validity 
of a community benefit agreement. 
Criteria Y N 
1) They involve a single development X 
2) They are a legally-binding contract X 
3) They address a range of community interests X 
4) They are a product of substantial community
involvement
X 
CBA Evaluation: Successes, Challenges and Opportunities for 
Improvement 
Based on Gross’s four criteria checklist this CBA requires opportunity for 
improvement based on its merit as a non-legally binding contract, conflicts of interest, 
and limited engagement with the community. In this case, this agreement was used as 
a mechanism to prevent opposition by the community and a trade-off rather than 
directly working with the community to create a plan that avoids displacement and 
creates empowerment. This is due to the MOU being signed and not outlining specific 
details of the agreement that the CBA is not legally binding (Salkin and Lavine, 2008, 
p. 316). Furthermore, within this CBA development corporations and local
community leaders were created as a community negotiating body. However, local 
elected representatives often had a conflict of interest and the process became 
politicized (Been, 2010, p. 16). It was unclear which interests were being promoted. 
Columbia’s rezoning plan was approved at the same time as the contradictory 
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rezoning proposal was made by the local community board (Sheikn, 2009, p. 232). The main 
critiques were although City officials did not negotiate the CBA directly, they played a role in 
the development process. The Mayor’s office elected Watchtel & Masyr LLP, a firm with 
significant experience with CBAs as counsel to the WHLDC, as a professional mediator to 
facilitate the CBA negotiations (New York City Bar, 2010, p. 22). Furthermore, the Office of 
Office of Corporation Counsel offered legal advice to elected officials part of the WHLDC 
(New York City Bar, 2010). Through this analysis, elected officials had an opportunity to 
influence outcomes and promote pro-growth agendas through the CBA within the hiring of 
legal attorneys in the negotiation process. The project successes to-date the CBA promises have 
been upheld, however, through analyzing this project’s history, it can be stated that community 
concerns of displacement had not been addressed. However, since the 16- year project 
continues it is early to say if the obligations have been fulfilled (Fisher, Zients & Donnely, 
2015). The opportunities for improvement are to ensure effective enforcement a mechanism for 
monitoring, enforcement, and compliance is required to ensure the success of this CBA. 
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Concluding Remarks: Case Studies in the US 
Through investigation of the U.S. case studies, the community advocated for benefits in 
government- supported large-scale projects including sports stadiums, and university 
expansions. Scholars state that urban development is critical for city growth and 
economic prosperity, however, gentrification has led to inequitable outcomes for 
racialized, low-income, and marginalized communities. For instance, in December 2011, 
African American’s unemployment rates were twice that of their white American 
counterparts (Severin, 215). The essay “The Changing State of Gentrification,” 
examines a history of systemic gentrification within New York’s Neighbourhoods and 
the findings were that the state (at the city and federal level) had direct involvement in 
organizing and encouraging gentrification (Hackworth and Smith, p. 469.) This is 
significant since most major infrastructure projects are state-led. In “The City as a 
Growth Machine (1976),” Molotch describes the historical development of major 
American cities as “an expression of the interests of land-based elites that profit from 
the intensification of land (p. 309).” This regime continues today through the allocation 
of public resources and local land-use agendas. (Molotch, 1976). Through analysis of 
the New York city case studies, it is evident that the large-scale developments were 
supported by government funding and policies. Through governmental support 
including gaining zoning approvals, and through the use of“eminent domain,” this 
allowed a process of creative destruction where lower- income minority populations 
were displaced in the process. Community Benefit Agreements provide an opportunity 
to minimize impacts of gentrification and to provide equitable outcomes to under- 
served communities through community benefit agreements. Through investigation of 
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the U.S. case studies it can be stated that the U.S. model for securing CBAs is a 
bottom-up approach. This approach is where a coalition is created to advocate 
community benefits through community involvement. The grassroots organization puts 
the pressure on decision-makers with them to secure an agreement that represents the 
community’s interests (Atkinson Foundation, 2016, p. 4). 
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Chapter 4: CBA Case Studies in Canada 
Through a comparative analysis of the three Canadian case studies, I will assess their 
successes & challenges by evaluating the 1) employment opportunities, 2) community & 
environmental impacts, and 3) affordable housing present for each community benefit 
agreement. Lastly, I will provide critiques of their limitations and opportunities for 
improvement. The three case studies that will be analyzed in this chapter include: the BC 
Olympic Village, the Rexdale-Casino Woodbine, and the Eglinton Crosstown community 
benefit agreements. These case studies will be examined through the Growth Machine 
approach, which conceptualizes cities as growth machines with unified and powerful elites as 
growth coalitions that pursue a pro-growth agenda (Cain, 2014). 
Case Study #4: Vancouver’s Olympic Village 
Table 10: List of key actors in Vancouver’s Olympic Village Redevelopment 
Key Actors Description 
Millennium Southeast 
False Creek Properties 
Developer 
BOB (Building Inner City 
Businesses) 
Community coalition negotiating directly with the 
developer (a local coalition of 29 community 
groups and five labour unions) 
City of Vancouver Governmental agency involved with the project 
Nokia 
Fox Entertainment Group 







History & Background 
As part of Molotch’s pro- growth agenda 
the construction of sports arenas and 
stadiums to host events are often 
celebrated and advocated by 
governmental officials and politicians 
(Cain, 2014). In the Vancouver 2010 
Winter Games, there were initiatives to 
mitigate some of the adverse impacts 
on local communities (Gold, 2017, p. 
226). Before, the Olympic Games 
occurred, there were plans to gain community group approval during the early stages of project 
build-out. As a result, there was a series of urban renewal initiatives and the creation of the Inner 
City Inclusivity Statement (ICICS) to protect the interests of affected low-income communities 
(Vanwynsberghe, Surborg & Wyly, 2013). Furthermore, there was a proposal to develop an 
Olympic Village on False Creek, and there was a CBA agreement signed to gain community 
approval (Scherer, 2011). Within the project proposal, the Olympic Village was the first phase of 
the Southeast False Creek Community Plan to be completed before the 2010 Olympic and 
Paralympic Games (The City of Vancouver et al., 2010, p. 7). This included the construction of 
14 residential buildings (out of 1,100 housing units, 250 would be affordable, and 110 would be 
rental units), 70,000 square feet of retail space, a community centre, and several structures that 
would house athletes and officials and be converted to permanent residential housing after the 
games (City of Vancouver, 2012). Future phases of the project were said to include more than 
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5,000 residential units, a full-sized community centre, a non-motorized boating facility, 3-5 child 
care centre and child care facilities, an elementary school, and 10 hectares of open space (City of 
Vancouver, 2012, p. 2) The major players involved in this case study include Millennium as the 
Developer, Building Inner City Businesses (BOB), as the representative of communities and 
primary negotiator, the City of Vancouver as the main governmental agency representing the 
project, the Olympic Resistance Network as the resistance group, and the Vancouver Organizing 
Committee as the supporting group. 
BC Olympic Village CBA Project Targets 
Table 11: Project targets within the BC Olympic Village CBA. Key targets sorted 
by: 1) employment opportunities, 2) community and environmental improvements, 
3) affordable housing
1) Employment Opportunities ● 100 jobs for inner-city residents
(instead 120 residents employed)
● $750,000 to support inner-city hiring
and procurement,
● $15 million inner city
procurement (instead, $42 million
in goods and services procured).
● 10 construction training courses,





● New inner-city business registry
with over 200 inner-city
construction businesses
developed.
3) Affordable Housing ● 252 units of affordable housing
(not part of CBA agreement, but
part of Development Agreement).
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The CBA Process 
An earlier process of securing agreements led the way for the social and economic benefits. This 
included the Vancouver Agreement of 2000 (Peachey, 2009, p. 2). This initiative involved all 
three levels of government to support sustainable social, economic, and community 
development of the Vancouver inner-city, and inclusivity commitments to maximize 
opportunities and mitigate impacts from the Games in the inner city in 2003 
(Vancouver Agreement, 2010). However, critics state that this initiative's main goal was to 
revitalize and develop Vancouver’s inner cities particularly the Downtown Eastside due to its 
high rates of poverty, crime, and homelessness crisis (City of Vancouver, 2020). In 2003, the 
Inner-City Inclusivity Commitments (ICI) framework was formed by three forms of government 
to maximize and mitigate potential impacts from hosting the Olympic Winter Games within 
inner- city neighborhoods (Vancouver 2010 Olympics, 2019). However, when the bid to host 
the winter games were unsuccessful, the Vancouver Organizing Committee (VANOC) adopted 
the ICI. Additionally, the BOB (Building Inner City Businesses) organization was formed in 
2005 and acted as a primary negotiator within the Community Benefit Agreement that followed 
(Graser, 2016, p. 15). In its role as a negotiator, it acted as the primary community 
representative that acted on the feedback of community organizations and representatives. The 
Olympic Resistance Network was the anti-growth coalition in this narrative that attempted to 
disrupt the 2010 Winter Games Olympic torch run in an attempt to raise awareness of the 
detrimental effects of the Olympic Games including homelessness, building on indigenous land, 
and pursuit of capitalist agendas (Grainger, 2010). In 2007, a hybrid CBA was created for the 
Vancouver Village. 
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This CBA was signed with the City of Vancouver, Millennium Properties, and the developer to 
support job provision to local residents, business procurement strategies, and funding to support 
community benefit initiatives (Graser, 2016, p. 5). The CBA included 100 jobs for inner city 
residents, $750,000 to support inner-city hiring and procurement, and $15 million in inner-city 
procurement as well as a new inner-city business registry (Peachey, 2009, pp. 3-4). The property 
would house the athletes during the 2010 Winter Olympics and then be opened to residents after 
the games were completed (Peachey, 2009). 
Gross’s Four Criteria Checklist 
Table 12: The following checklist is used to evaluate the Olympic Village 
CBA. It includes Gross’s four criteria which determine the validity of a 
community benefit agreement. 
Criteria Y N 
1) They involve a single development X 
2) They are a legally-binding contract X 
3) They address a range of community interests X 
4) They are a product of substantial community
involvement
X 
CBA Evaluation: Successes, Challenges & Opportunities for Improvement 
Based on meeting Gross’s four criteria and through further analysis this CBA the 
Vancouver CBA is considered a success. Through analysis, it can be stated that the 
project targets outlined in the CBA for the developer were concise and easy to follow. In 
the end, the targets proposed surpassed the $15M procurement target. In total, $42 
million was spent on providing goods, services, and equipment to inner- city businesses 
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(Peachey, 2009, p. 16). Additionally, 120 construction jobs were secured and jobs and 
apprenticeship programs gave first preference to inner-city residents (Graser, 2016, p. 
15). Other mechanisms were used successfully from the negotiation to the evaluation 
stage, regular progress reports, income support for job trainees, and customized design 
of employment programs to the targeted population (Graser, 2016, p. 15). The main 
critiques that arose from this CBA include: job stability and job suitability. In terms of 
job stability, construction jobs were often not short-term contracts based on specific 
building sites. Therefore, there is a lack of long-term placements in this CBA. In terms 
of job suitability, not all residents are suitable for the physical strength, endurance, and 
overall health needed to support this project. For instance, construction jobs favour men 
over women or youth, and are not for people with disabilities (Peachey, 2009, p. 14). 
The opportunities for improvement are although a new neighbourhood was built within 
the Olympic Village many of the services were not accounted for. For instance, after 10 
years there is still no school in the neighbourhood that was promised before the 2010 
Olympics (Agahi, 2020). Another issue was that the development of the Olympic 
Village is criticized by going over budget (Peachey, 2009). The areas of improvement 
include that the developer, governmental entities, and local politicians had a pro- growth 
neo-liberal approach when designing the project plan and CBA agreement (Gold, 
2017,p. 227). For future endeavors, the involved parties should consider social inclusion 
within large- scale projects and promote the inclusion of community groups when 
undertaking major decisions. Hence, more effective community engagement and 
monitoring need to be taken ensure the community needs continue to be met within this 
CBA. 
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Case Study #5: Rexdale-Woodbine Casino CBA 
Table 13: List of key actors in the Rexdale-Woodbine Casino Redevelopment 
Key Actors Description 
Great Canadian Gaming GTA LP 
(includes a partnership with Great 
Canadian Gaming, Brookfield Business 
Partners and Clairvest Group) 
Developer 
One Toronto Gaming Woodbine Casino operator 
City of Toronto 
OLG (Ontario Lottery and Gaming- 
owned by the government of Ontario) 
The main government agencies involved 
in the project 
Toronto Community Benefits Network 
(TCBN) 
Primary negotiators and representatives 
of the community in this development 
Rexdale Rising 
Rexdale’s Community Organizing for 
Responsible Development (CORD) 
Main community groups are responsible 
for advocating and negotiating benefits. 
The Rexdale-Woodbine Casino 
expansion is a $1 billion project that 
includes a casino, two hotels, several 
restaurants, retail stores, a theatre, and 
a training center on the existing 
Woodbine Racetrack site in the 
Rexdale neighbourhood in Toronto. 
(Olatoye, Ong et al., 2019). The 
Rexdale-Casino Woodbine 
Community Benefits Agreement was   
created through community 
intervention and is the first CBA coordinated by the municipal government agency in Toronto. (City of 
Toronto, 2020). 
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• In the first two years of gaming 40% of total employees
will have full time employment. In the next two years,
50% of the total employees will have full-time
employment.
• 40% new hires through local or social hiring {Local
hiring indicates employment opportunities for people in
the Woodbine local area. Social hiring includes
employing people who self-identify with an equity




Rexdale-Casino Woodbine CBA is an example of a public CBA that was signed by City of 
Toronto and One Toronto Gaming (formerly OGGLP). One Toronto Gaming was formed as a 
partnership between the developer Brookfield Business Partners and the Great Canadian Gaming. 
TCBN is a community advocacy group that led a campaign to make the community’s expectations 
known to City Council, One Toronto Gaming, and City of Toronto staff. Through the development 
of project targets and effective community engagement with residents and stakeholders, it 
influenced the creation of the City of Toronto Community Benefits Framework that was passed in 
council in July 2019. The major players involved in this case study include: the developer: Great 
Canadian Gaming, GTA the City of Toronto, Ontario Lottery and Gaming (OLG), One Toronto 
Gaming, the Toronto Community Benefits Network (TCBN) and the involved community group 
Rexdale Rising. 
Rexdale-Woodbine Casino CBA Project Targets 
Table 14: Project targets within the Rexdale-Woodbine Casino CBA. Key targets 
sorted by: 1) employment opportunities, 2) community and environmental 
improvements, 3) affordable housing 
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• 10% annual procurement through local or diverse suppliers
• 10% of construction hours through local or social hiring
• A target to develop a 20-year Employment and Labour
Market Plan that includes career mentoring, recruitment
opportunities, scholarship opportunities, and job




• $5 million towards a child care centre.
• 1 community event per month in an entertainment
venue at little to no cost. 
• An international marketing plan and the creation








• The monitoring of the CBA will be evaluated by:
-a) Community Steering Committee (organized by the City of
Toronto)
-b) Casino Woodbine Responsible Gambling Oversight
Committee (organized by OLG)
-c) Employment & Labour Market Advisory Working
Group (organized by One Toronto Gaming).
• One Toronto Gaming to provide quarterly and annual
reports to the public on the CBA commitments.
• There will be an annual city staff member to report to
City Council and produce additional staff reports (when
necessary).
51 
The CBA Process 
The Rexdale-Casino Woodbine CBA came about when the government of Ontario was interested 
in expanding the gaming types that take place at Casino Woodbine. When the proposal was 
introduced it was known as “Woodbine Live,” and it was approved by the City of Toronto. 
However, this development never occurred due to the developer backing out (Rexdale Rising, 
2018). In August 2017, OLG started the procurement process to find a new developer to redevelop 
the existing site. The Provincial government through OLG wanted to expand to table gaming. For 
OLG to expand gaming, it needed approval from the City of Toronto. Furthermore, there was a 
lack of consensus on what direction to proceed. Some members of city council wanted to expand 
gaming, as it would bring more economic development opportunity and growth through new jobs, 
hotels, and restaurants for Rexdale community. On the other hand, other council members were 
opposed and stated that expanded casino would bring more crime, traffic, problem gambling, and 
didn’t want to bring this to the Rexdale neighbourhood. The compromise was to create a 
community benefit agreement to reserve jobs and community benefits for Rexdale (Participant 7, 
Personal Communication, 05/08/20). A year later in 2018, the CBA was signed with the operator of 
the Woodbine Racetrack: One Toronto Gaming and the City of Toronto after a decade of 
mobilization by the community for the inclusion of local needs and benefits within development 
projects (Nanji, 2019). The goal of the CBA was to mitigate the negative effects of the expanded 
gaming development to gain opportunities to benefit the community and all equity-seeking groups 
across Toronto (City of Toronto, 2019b). The Rexdale-Casino Woodbine CBA included specific 
requirements that One Toronto Gaming to adhere to. 
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The targets include 40% new hires through local or social hiring, 10% annual procurement through 
local or diverse suppliers, 10% of construction hours through local or social hiring, $5 million 
towards a child care centre and annual monitoring One Toronto Gaming to provide quarterly and 
annual reports to the public on CBA commitments (City of Toronto, 2019). 
Gross’s Four Criteria Checklist 
Table 15: The following checklist is used to evaluate the Rexdale Woodbine Casino 
CBA. It includes Gross’s four criteria which determine the validity of a community 
benefit agreement. 
Criteria Y N 
1) They involve a single development X 
2) They are a legally-binding contract X 
3) They address a range of community interests X 
4) They are a product of substantial community
involvement
X 
CBA Evaluation: Successes, Challenges & Opportunities for Improvement 
Based on meeting Gross’s four criteria and through further analysis this CBA the Rexdale- 
Woodbine Casino is considered a success. Furthermore, this development does not displace any 
residents as the development is built on the existing Woodbine Casino, and addresses long-term 
community concerns through the incorporation of the legally binding CBA. Through this 
agreement, there is evidence that there was significant community involvement. After the CBA 
was signed, Rosemarie Powell, the Executive Director of TCBN exclaimed: “The Rexdale 
community has a lot to be proud of this is a big step towards securing an agreement that can result in 
good jobs for residents (TCBN, 2018).”
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Through analysis, the targets are seen as clear and achievable and some targets have been 
surpassed. To date, the CBA targets are on track, and a total of 1,150 new employees have 
been hired. In total, 11% (134 individuals) were local while 72% (828 individuals) were social 
hires (City of Toronto, 2019a). Of these hires, 60% (950 individuals) are employed full-
time. Ontario Gaming has contributed $5 million for the development of a childcare center to 
benefit Casino Woodbine residents and employees. This is significant because Rexdale had one of 
the lowest childcare rates (22%) across the city, and the development of a new childcare centre 
was a major achievement for the community (Rexdale Rising, 2018). Furthermore, an oversight 
committee was created which includes two community members, TCBN and United Way 
representatives and the developer will meet every quarter to review outcomes and address 
concerns (Participant 6, Personal Communication, 05/06/20). Lastly, the city will provide yearly 
updates on the progress of the CBA, and the construction completion is expected to be in 2021 
(City of Toronto, 2020). 
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Case Study #6: Metrolinx Eglinton Crosstown CBA 
Table 16: List of key actors in the Metrolinx Eglinton Crosstown Redevelopment 
Key Actor Description 
Metrolinx Developer 
Toronto and York Region 
Labour Council 
The public agency spearheading the project 
Toronto Community Benefits 
Network 
Third-Party Negotiator 
City of Toronto Land-owner 
Little Jamaica & Golden Mile 
(Toronto neighbourhoods affected by 
LRT construction) 
Resistance group 
United Way Toronto Supporting group 
Introduction 
The Eglinton Crosstown LRT is 
Metrolinx’s first CBA program and is 
the largest transit history expansion in 
the history of Toronto. In 2007, the 
redevelopment expansion was 
announced and it includes a 19-kilometer 
light rail line that runs through a series of 
high- priority neighbourhoods (Graser, 
 
Figure 7: Map of Eglinton LRT Stations and Stops 
Source: Metrolinx (2020). Stations and Stops [electronic] 
Retrieved from: http://www.metrolinx.com 
2016, p. 15). The Crosstown is said to have up to 25 stations, 54 bus routes, three subway 
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1) Employment Opportunities
stations as well as various GO lines (Crosslinx, 2016). The CBA signed by TCBN and Metrolinx 
commits to local hiring and social procurement within the construction of the new transit line and to 
leverage the $5.3 billion infrastructure investment to create economic opportunities for residents from
historically disadvantaged groups (TCBN, 2017). The major players involved in this case study 
include: Metrolinx as the developer, Toronto and York Region Labour Council, and City of Toronto 
as the partner public agencies, the Toronto Community Networks (TCBN) as the hired third-party 
negotiator, and Little Jamaica and the Golden Mile community as the opposing group, and the United 
Way Toronto as the supporting group. 
Metrolinx Eglinton Crosstown CBA Project Targets 
Table 17: Project targets within the Metrolinx Eglinton Crosstown CBA. Key targets 
sorted by: 1) employment opportunities, 2) community and environmental improvements, 
3) affordable housing.
● 46,000 jobs (Total number of
jobs to be determined after
project completion)
● 100% of all new apprentices
working on the Crosstown LRT
project hired through existing
union-run, pre- apprenticeship
programs that support equity- 
seeking and historically
disadvantaged groups (Later, the
target was signed on November 16,
2016, that the goal was workers
from historically disadvantaged
and equity-seeking groups would
perform 10% of all trade or craft
working hours on a trade-by- trade
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basis (Metrolinx, 2016). 
● To support internationally trained
professional immigrants in securing
jobs in their field (no program was
initiated for immigrant employers
after the agreement was signed by




3) Affordable Housing • N/A
The CBA Process 
In 2003, a citywide coalition of grassroots community groups, social agencies and trade unions formed 
the Toronto Community Benefits Network building on many of the efforts from a previous 
neighborhood coalition known as the Mount Dennis Weston Network (Nugent, p. 93). The goal was to 
create a CBA to equitably distribute jobs and economic benefits to the Crosstown LRT due to 
Toronto’s deepening socio-spatial polarization (Hulchanski, 2010) and the fact that it would run 
through nine of Toronto’s Priority Neighbourhoods containing low- income, racialized, and under 
serviced inner suburbs (Rankin & McLean, 2015). In spring 2014, Metrolinx, TCBN, a coalition of 80 
labour and community groups successfully negotiated the CBA for the construction of the
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 Eglinton Crosstown. (TCBN, 2018). The CBA framework was developed through input from 
impacted communities along the Eglinton Crosstown LRT line (Dragicevic, and Ditta, 2016). The 
Framework includes working toengage communities, recruit job seekers through apprenticeship 
programs, and to communicate about the opportunities to communities affected (Nugent, 2017, p. 
95). Later, these community benefit clauses were included in a formal agreement between Metrolinx, 
Infrastructure Ontario, and Crosslinx. (Graser, 2016, p. 15). The Community Benefit Agreement 
(CBA) outlines apprenticeship opportunities, opportunities for hiring skilled newcomers, and 
neighborhood improvements. The achievements that were associated with the implementation of the 
CBA include 10% of all trade or craft working hours are to be performed by historically 
disadvantages residents, the hiring 50 newcomers, and the preservation of the Kodak building as a 
historical site that will be incorporated into the design of Mount Dennis LRT station and made 
available for community use (Olatoye, Ong et al., 2019, p. 12). 
Gross’s Four Criteria Checklist 
Table 18: The following checklist is used to evaluate the Eglinton 
Crosstown CBA. It includes Gross’s four criteria which determine 
the validity of a community benefit agreement. 
Criteria Y N 
1) They involve a single development X 
2) They are a legally-binding contract X 
3) They address a range of community
interests
X 




CBA Evaluation: Successes, Challenges & Opportunities for Improvement 
Based on Gross’s four criteria checklist this is an ineffective CBA and requires an opportunity for 
improvement. This evaluation is based on its merit as an infrastructure project (rather than a single 
development), its status as a non-legally-binding contract, and its inability to address a range of 
community interests (by having a narrow focus on only employment opportunities). Rather than a 
formal agreement, Metrolinx instead committed to a “community benefits program,” that offered a 
“range of employment, training, and apprenticeship opportunities for historically disadvantaged 
communities and equity- seeking groups as well as encouraging the provision of goods from local 
supplies and social enterprises (Metrolinx & Toronto Community Benefits Network, 2014).” The 
success of this CBA is as a large infrastructure project, this agreement has the potential for creating 
local job benefits as well as providing large financial returns for the community and local businesses 
(Nickle, 2019). In terms of monitoring, the Ministry of Training, Colleges, and Universities and the 
United Way worked in partnership to identify the skills gaps in neighbourhoods along the Eglinton 
Crosstown LRT to identify needs in future coordination, training, and employment requirements 
(Metrolinx & Toronto Community Benefits Network, 2014). Metrolinx agreed to include the Toronto 
Community Benefits Network in a working group that would facilitate the monitoring 
and evaluation of the framework, and to perform outreach (Nugent, 2019, p. 80). Furthermore, this 
CBA will serve as a test case for future major infrastructure projects (Metrolinx & Toronto 
Community Benefits Network, 2014). Metrolinx's CBA was created from the Community Benefits 
Agreement Model, and it is strongly supported in provincial policies such as Bill 6: Infrastructure for 
Jobs and Prosperity Act. 
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In addition, there will be a $130 billion investment in new provincial infrastructure for the next 10 
years that includes a framework for Community Benefit agreements when making decisions regarding 
investments (Galley, 2015). The challenges of this CBA are that “historically disadvantaged 
communities,”remains an undefined term and makes it easy to add additional worker groups that count 
towards the 10% target (Nugent, 2007, p. 103). Furthermore, the target of 10% is much lower than the 
original target proposed by TCBN, which was the hiring of 100% of historically disadvantaged and 
equity-seeking groups including a well-versed definition of these groups in the original Network’s 
CBA proposals (Metrolinx & Toronto Community Benefits Network, 2014). Within the CBA there 
was a program allocated to support internationally trained immigrants in securing jobs in their field. 
However, no program was initiated after Metrolinx signed the agreement. Moreover, there is limited 
monitoring of the promises of apprenticeship opportunities as there is a promise of 46,000 jobs after 
project completion but there is no information on the current number of jobs currently allocated to 
local hires. The current criticisms of this project are that it was stated that Metrolinx expects the 
Eglinton LRT to be completed by 2021, however, due to large project delays, that does not seem 
applicable and the completion date is pushed back to 2022 (Gooch, 2020). 
Additionally, the historic Little Jamaica community located on Eglinton West was heavily impacted by 
the construction of the LRT through the closure of many businesses. It is estimated that due to 
construction 40-45% of businesses have closed or relocated since construction started (McLean, 2019). 
As a result, communities like Little Jamaica could be eradicated in the construction phase of this 
development. Another community that was negatively impacted by the Eglinton Crosstown expansion 
includes the Golden Mile Business complex of East Scarborough.
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Similar to Little Jamaica, access to the local businesses is limited and many have had to cut down on 
employees, and business is down 50% due to Eglinton LRT construction (CBC News, 2019). The 
opportunities for improvement for the future are to develop a system to ensure CBA monitoring, 
accountability, as well as a procedure for public reporting. Currently, there is no process in place for 
collecting demographic data necessary to evaluate the community benefits program. Furthermore, the 
scope of the project is too broad, as it does not involve a single development, and runs through many 
neighbourhoods in Toronto. Hence it is a challenge to measure and evaluate the impact of the 
employment benefits that have been allocated within each residential area. 
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Concluding Remarks: Canadian Case Studies 
Through investigation of the Canadian case studies, the growth machine ideology was evident 
through the partnerships made with city and provincial officials in the development of major 
publicly funded infrastructure projects (i.e. transit projects, sports arenas, and casinos). Molotch 
(1976) explains that local politics use national policies that create a regime that influences the 
growth machine and creates priorities and new opportunities for urban civic life (p. 329). Through 
this analysis, it can be indicated that it can be stated that the Canadian model for securing CBAs is a 
hybrid of the bottom-up and top-down approach. In this case, municipal and provincial governments 
are providing more policy leadership than within the US, and are working towards a system where 
community benefits can be required by law as part of major government procurements (Atkinson 
Foundation, 2016, p. 4). My findings suggest that this approach can bring significant benefits to the 
community if priority is given by governments to advance these initiatives and is supported by all 
three levels of government In particular; the federal government plans to invest $120 billion in 
infrastructure developments, while the province will invest $137 billion (Atkinson Foundation, 
2016). Within these large sums of money can be reinvested into the community through community 
benefit clauses. Through government intervention, community visions can be realized. 
Through Hulchanski’s analysis on “The Three Cities within Toronto (2010),” it is evident that socio-
spatial polarization based on gender, age, and class exists within major Canadian cities including 
Toronto. The idea of the “right to the city,” was a slogan proposed by Lefebvre and has since been 
adopted by social movements, and local authorities as a call to action to reclaim the city as detached 
from the effects of gentrification and rise of socio-spatial inequality.
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By reclaiming our urban spaces through community benefit agreements, residents can achieve 
Lefebvre’s principle of the “right to the city.” This theory highlights the opposition that exists 
between the use-value and the exchange- values within a city. The use-value refers to the communal 
use of land, while the exchange-value emphasizes the privatization of land through the creation of 
spaces that can be sold and bought and through the consumption of products (Lefebvre, 1996, p. 
17). Lehrer and Wieditz add to this narrative in their publication “Condominium Development and 
Gentrification.” It is stated that the emerging condo towers contribute to the growing spatial 
segregation that exists in the city through gentrification (Lehrer, U., Wieditz, T., 2009, p. 141). 
Campaigning for radical changes enhances community power and decision-making. This allows 
communities to have the chance to transform and reshape their neighbourhoods based on their needs 
rather than those of property owners (Purcell, 2013). Through citizen participation in planning and 
decision-making processes, the principles incorporating participatory planning practices to build 
equitable communities can be manifested. This includes an emphasis on resident involvement in 
neighbourhood planning practices and contributing to improvements in community amenities and 
environmental conditions. 
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Chapter 5: Interview Findings 
Nine semi-structured interviews were conducted with a variety of stakeholders who have been 
involved in the CBA negotiation process including community advocates, researchers, 
governmental agencies, and third-party mediators in the Greater Toronto Area. Some research 
participants had more knowledge and experience in negotiating CBA agreements than others. 
Through this study, I attempt to connect and assess responses in regards to my research question 
of “How can case studies on CBAs within the US & Canadian context serve as a model to 
achieve equitable planning? How do community benefit agreements differ in these contexts and 
how do we define their successes, challenges, and limitations to offer opportunities for 
implementation within Toronto?” For my interview findings, I utilized the research method 
“thematic analysis,” designed by Braun & Clarke (2006). In this section, I will provide an 
overview of the research participant’s responses to my research questions and describe CBA’s 
opportunities for implementation within Toronto. The three main themes that I discovered within 
my research data include: CBAs as a tool for building community power and wealth, CBAs and 
their implication for local policy, and CBAs and their implications for implementation, 
monitoring, and evaluation. 
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Thematic Analysis 
1) CBAs as a tool for building community power and wealth
My interview findings suggest that there was a consensus among all parties that community benefit 
agreements could contribute to the creation of power and wealth. This could be done through the 
promotion of increased community engagement, affordable housing, and equitable planning 
processes. However, these responses offered mixed-review critiques of CBAs and their mechanisms 
to ensure accountability. Participants described that community benefits were a method of building  
1) CBAs as a tool for building community power and wealth
2) CBAs and their implications for local policy.
3) CBAs and their implications for implementation, monitoring and evaluation. 
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community power and that this could be done through the opportunity to get engaged and to extract 
benefits from large infrastructure projects to collect funds to support their local economies (Participant 9, 
Personal Communication, 06/16.20). A majority of the participants explained that CBAs could offset 
many of negative impacts that can arise from a new development including gentrification, displacement, 
and increased traffic. As well, CBAs create opportunities for historically disadvantaged communities to 
make an impact in their communities such as jobs, training, and mentorship opportunities. Within the 
interviews, it was stated that CBA’s had the potential to contribute to more equitable planning processes. 
CBAs were described as “an incredible tool to demonstrate how communities can benefit from 
investments in the community. Benefits are usually abstract, and it is difficult to see economic benefits 
within development projects (Participant 1, Personal Communication, 04/09/20).” The impact that 
community benefit agreements could add to creating an equitable planning process is through including 
minority, marginalized, and racialized community members that have previously been left out of these 
development processes. This can be done through engagement with low-income or unemployed 
individuals through identifying the main issues, looking for potential solutions, and on- the-ground 
implementation of these solutions (Participant 4, Personal Communication, 05/03/20). In response to 
CBAs implications for effective community engagement, the respondents often stated that despite the 
comprehensive system for community engagement within Planning, there was an argument that there 
was often an over- representation by a certain demographic group namely, white middle-class 
homeowners (Participant 8, Personal Communication, 05/08/20). Lastly, it was discussed that to create 
greater inclusivity the current planning process should be oriented towards standards that promote 
community health, and improve access to affordable housing and employment. Furthermore, some 
recommendations for improvement in government policy is requiring developers to provide a progress 
report that can be evaluated by the community on how they plan to provide benefits through outlining 
specific targets, and metrics within new developments to ensure accountability (Participant 4, Personal 
Communication, 05/30/20).
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In response to CBAs capacity for creating community wealth “community benefits” were described 
as a way of leveraging dollars already being spent, often on large infrastructure and development 
projects, to maximize economic and social returns for local communities (Participant 5, Personal 
Communication, 05/05/20). A distinction was made regarding creating community wealth as creating 
community wealth is often an outcome from private- public partnerships on municipally owned land 
(Participant 2, Personal Communication, 04/15/20). It was stated that land is the most valuable 
commodity in Toronto. Particularly, keeping the money from land sales circulating in a local 
economy was highlighted as essential as most profit goes overseas if there are foreign investors 
(Participant 9, Personal Communication, 06/16/20). Moreover, it was explained, “CBAs absolutely 
have the opportunity to create community wealth. I see community wealth as community 
democratically owning or being able to exert agency over the tools and systems that generate, 
sustain, and share prosperity locally and in an equitable way (Participant 8, Personal Communication, 
05/08/20).” Lastly, it was described that community benefits are just one of the set of tools used to 
create community wealth. Other tools include: land trusts, cooperatives, and anchor institutions 
(Participant 9, Personal Communication, 06/16/20). In terms of CBA’s ability to contribute to 
affordable housing, all participants agreed that CBAs had this capacity. Specifically, one interview 
participant mentioned that Toronto Housing Secretariat must be included as a stakeholder to these 
obligations as it manages the planning and implementation of Toronto’s affordable housing projects 
(Participant 7, Personal Communication, 05/08/20). In regards, to how this would be achieved, some 
pointed to other case studies, while others did not know how to apply this within Toronto. There was 
no mention of combining land trusts, co-ops, or non-profit housing within CBA agreements. 
However, it was mentioned that when building affordable housing units, developers expect a tradeoff 
or to get something in return (i.e. density transfers, an expedited process, approvals, etc.). Hence, if 
the requirement to build affordable housing is not legally binding, there is not much incentive by 
developers to build it (Participant 10, 06/19/20). 
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Figure 9: A comparison of the development process with or without a CBA. 
Source: Gross, J., Leroy, G, and Aparicio, M.J. (2005). Community Benefit Agreements. Making 
Development Projects Accountable. Good Jobs First and the California Partnership for Working Families. 
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The critiques that were offered in terms of CBAs mechanisms to ensure accountability, was that there was a 
clear distinction made between community benefit agreements (CBAs) and community benefits secured in 
procurement. It was outlined that a majority of infrastructure projects in Toronto have involved community 
benefits secured in procurement rather than community benefit agreements (Participant 5, Personal 
Communication, 05/05/20). Furthermore, Community Benefits in Procurement can be defined as social 
benefits (hospitals, employment, etc.) that are secured through bids for municipal or provincial infrastructure 
projects. Community Benefit Agreements (CBAs) on the other hand are legal contracts that can be enforced, 
requires community engagement, oversight, and monitoring by all involved stakeholders. Lastly, it was 
explained that community benefit agreements do not have the power to ultimately restructure the planning 
process, and only through legislation and effective enforcement would ensure developers are held 
accountable to their commitments (Participant 7, Personal Communication, 05/08/20). 
2) CBAs and their implications for local policy
Within my interview findings, it was suggested by the participants that Community Benefit Agreements 
share similarities and are driven by other city policies and initiatives. The main implications that community 
benefits have for future policy development is the community benefits framework aligned with government 
objectives such as the City of Toronto Poverty Reduction Strategy, and Social Procurement Strategy. In the 
future, as new policies arise and the past method of obtaining community benefits through Section 37 will 
get replaced by provincial legislation More Homes, More Choices Act. This creates the need to secure 
additional benefits through direct negotiation with developers through other means including community 
benefit agreements. 
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The significance of future policy development is that by making community benefit agreements legally 
binding and applicable to major infrastructure projects within Toronto, this will allow for employment 
equity, citizen participation, and possibly more affordable housing stock to be created as a result of these 
agreements. Currently, the City of Toronto Social Development, Finance, and Administration Division is 
the department responsible for leading the Community Benefits initiatives (Participant 2, Personal 
Communication, 04/15/20). Following the adoption of the Rexdale-Woodbine Casino CBA two reports 
were submitted to Toronto City Council. This includes the initial City of Toronto Community Benefits 
Framework report and the supplementary report that included a discussion about measurable targets. The 
City of Toronto Benefit Framework aligns with the Social Procurement program and the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (Participant 7, Personal Communication, 05/08/20). 
It was described, “Within infrastructure projects, community benefits framework policy comes directly out 
of the poverty reduction strategy. We (TCBN) attempted to determine ways we can alleviate poverty in the 
city. CBAs can be used as a method to reduce poverty as inequality in the city is rising. The question we 
attempted to discover was: how do we balance this level playing field to secure targets for hiring and 
social infrastructure to help people thrive long-term (Participant 6, Personal Communication, 05/06/20)?” 
Furthermore, it was stated that governments could play a leadership role through policy development for 
the inclusion of community benefits in procurement strategies. This includes supporting developers that 
offer additional benefits or add value to communities such as hiring at-risk youth, building community 
centers, and other resources. 
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Many of the interview participants had experience in negotiating community benefits under Section 37. 
However, CBAs are unrelated to Section 37 benefits and the type of community benefits leveraged in 
these agreements are different. Within the interviews, it was mentioned that within the realm of current 
planning tools such as the planning act, there is not enough authority to enforce community benefit 
agreements (Participant 10, 06/19/20). However, due to its success, Section 37 can as a reference to 
securing benefits within the community benefits in the context of Toronto. Section 37 benefits are as a 
result of density bonusing and do not have a strong focus on inclusive economic development. The main 
focus is on providing “hard” benefits that include durable built-form capital facilities such as child care 
centre, parks or community centres. On the other hand, community benefit agreements are about 
offsetting the negative impacts of development within local communities that are marginalized. The main 
focus is providing “soft,” benefits that include jobs and business opportunities for targeted communities. 
Hence, community benefit agreements attempt to fill a gap that section 37 did not prioritize which is 
promoting equitable development within the planning process and including marginalized communities 
through participatory planning practices. 
In the future, Bill 108: More Homes, More Choices Act will be replacing Section 37 and may cause 
negative outcomes for securing community benefits. As the municipality is the major decision-maker for 
allocating Community Benefits (such as affordable housing, community centers, art, etc.) this may mean 
that certain services get cut as the municipality tries to cut back or save money on certain expenses.
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This can be detrimental for some lower-income individuals who rely on these programs. As the 
flexibility for negotiating benefits decreases, community benefit organizers need to look for other tools 
for enforcement such as Community Benefit Agreements. The main similarities that exist between 
Section 37 and Community Benefit Agreements are that both reinforce the redistribution of value to 
community. This is summarized in the statement “in order for market-value projects to be created in 
the planning system there need to be benefits given back to the community (Participant 1, Personal 
Communication, 04/09/20).” 
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Section 37 vs. Community Benefit Agreements 
Table 19: Illustrates the similarities and differences that exist between Section 37 & CBAs. 
Section 37 Similarities CBAs
• Planning-based
• Focus on “hard” community
benefits (built form
facilities).
• Section 37 benefits are
enforced by city planning
officials and local councilors.
• In Section 37 it is the
councilor is the primary
decision-maker (Hanff, 2016,
p. 38).
• The main goal of the
developer in section 37
benefits is to achieve increases




• A majority of section 37
secured benefits included art
and park space rather than
affordable housing or
community centres (Lehrer
and Wieditz, 2009, 149).
• Section 37 benefits are limited
in the sense they cannot
include non- capital benefits
such as employment or
procurement benefits (Hanff,
2016, p. 37).
• The methods for allocating
benefits in section 37 involves
in-kind (developer builds
benefit for local community)
or cash-in- lieu (cash
contributions to achieve
specific facilities.) 







(zoning, etc.) to gain
approval for a proposed
development project.
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• The value/type benefits
that is secured on a
case- by- case basis
• No set formula for
allocating benefits
• Section 37 funds and
CBAs are often as a tool
to secure affordable
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3) CBA’s implications for implementation, monitoring, and evaluation.
The main challenges that exist for implementation include: that the CBA framework establishes a 
broader idea; there are still contexts in which Community Benefits cannot be secured. A remaining 
challenge is how to provide benefits from private developments, rather than from public city-owned 
land. It is remains a challenge as it is unclear whether it is legal to enforce these agreements in this 
context (Participant 2, 04/15/20). It was mentioned that the main method of large-scale infrastructure 
procurement is through public-private partnerships (P3) made between governments and developers. 
Through these partnerships community benefit agreements can reap the rewards of these transactions 
(Participant 9, 06/16.20). Hence, changes in city policies and provincial legislation such as property 
rights may be required to ensure the developer’s accountability to CBAs. To hold developers 
accountable, there must be incentives created between the government and the developer to ensure 
effective enforcement of community benefits. Furthermore, several of the participants stated that each 
neighbourhood was different and that each context its own implications for effective implementation. 
However, it was suggested that lower-income areas such as Toronto’s Priority Neighbourhoods would 
greatly benefit from the incorporation of community benefit agreements within development projects, as 
these are often the most underserviced areas within Toronto. 
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The main challenges for monitoring that were identified include: “it is often difficult to measure the 
impact of less tangible benefits and establishing minimum requirements for enforcement.” For 
example, if the City creates a policy for hiring (10% local hiring.) Then the question becomes “What 
are the mechanisms to ensure this, what are the penalties, and how do you assess the benefits to 
support the continued use of the agreement (Participant 2,04/15/20).” Furthermore, community benefit 
agreements were often referred to as “just another type of legal agreement.” In this case, more research 
is needed in this area to ensure that all parties involved in the agreement uphold these signed contracts. 
It was suggested by many participants that a lawyer may need to present during the negotiations to 
ensure the legality and enforceability of these contracts is maintained Moreover, it was discussed that 
many communities may lack the resources or funding to seek legal advice and or/the willpower or 
knowledge to negotiate with major corporations. Hence, a third-party expert may be needed to ensure 
effective monitoring and to ensure that the contracts are legal and are maintained over time. 
The main challenges for the evaluation of CBAs within the Toronto context include: a community can 
only gain benefits and resources from a project if the CBA is enforceable over time. This includes a 
description of how the contract will be enforced, creating penalties for non-compliance, and leveraged 
mechanisms for enforcement to ensure that developers are held accountable. Moreover, many of the 
interview respondents state that the Rexdale- Woodbine Casino was the first genuine example of a 
CBA agreement in Toronto as it was legally-binding agreement signed by a local approval authority 
(the City of Toronto). Furthermore, my interview findings suggest that more research is needed from 
prior successful case studies outside of Toronto such as USA and UK, where CBAs have been 
implemented successfully to be able to successfully evaluate the benefits allocated within these 
agreements. 
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However, each neighbourhood is different, and as a result, the methods of evaluating community 
benefits can prove to be a challenge as each neighbourhood has different needs and visions. Hence it 
was stated that to fully evaluate the success of a CBA, a neighborhood’s needs and wants from a 
development must be assessed prior to the onset of the construction of a land development. 
Lessons Learned 
Through investigation of the case studies, it is clear that there are effective and ineffective CBAs and 
their success is determined by the commitment of involved project stakeholders to enforce and monitor 
the agreement. The lessons learned through the analysis of CBAs within the US & Canadian context, it 
is clear that CBAs have often failed since they lacked transparency within the project implementation 
stage. For instance, within the Atlantic Yards CBA there were promises for community benefits that 
were originally proposed but then delayed to an unknown point or disappeared completely (Graser, 
2016, p. 9). In terms of answering the research question “Through the analysis of case studies within 
US & Canada, how can community benefit agreements contribute to the common good and 
promote equitable planning practices? How do community benefit agreements differ in these 
contexts and how do we define their successes, challenges, and limitations to offer opportunities 
for implementation within Toronto?” posed at the beginning of the paper, the interview findings and 
literature review provide a good overview of how community benefit can be leveraged for Toronto. For 
effective implementation of a CBA, the offer needs to come directly from the developer and a third-
party plays a recognized role only once the developer makes a formal decision to make a deal 
(Baxamusa, 2008, p. 268). My findings through conducting this research study include that CBAs 
provide the opportunity to redistribute wealth back into local economies and prevent socio-spatial 
segregation of residential neighbourhoods.
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However, CBAs are not feasible for every new development and should be prioritized in 
neighbourhoods that require reinvestment (i.e. Toronto’s Priority Neighbourhoods). Additionally, 
within the CBA negotiations, a power imbalance exists between elected officials and the 
community. Thus, an oversight committee and active enforcement are required within community 
benefit clauses to secure benefits. Lastly, the success of a CBA often correlates directly with the 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms and specificity of the contract including specific 
requirements, clear responsibilities, and setting realistic targets (Atkinson Foundation, 2016). For 
CBAs to be implemented in Toronto there needs to be an examination of the current legislation from 
all levels of government. Furthermore, the jurisdiction for the implementation of CBAs goes beyond 
the scope of traditional planning tools and suggests examining social policies such as labour and 
hiring targets. This involves examining existing municipal programs such as: the TO Core’s 
Downtown Community Services and Facilities Strategy, TO Core’s Downtown Secondary Plan, and 
Toronto Poverty Reduction Strategy. Lastly, tools such as community impact statements can be used 
to encourage enforceability or the compliance of developers for projects that cause significant 
impacts to the neighbourhood. 
CBA Implementation: Successes & Challenges 
CBAs have both successes and challenges depending on the development project and there 
is no one-size-fits-all model. However, in most cases, the benefits that arise from CBA agreements 
outweigh the risks (Gross, LeRoy, and Aparicio, 2005 p. 25). 
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The successes of CBAs include: new alliances among community groups, early negotiations 
between developers and the community avoiding conflict and delays in the approval process, 
community concerns can be addressed “upfront,” CBAs ensure the developer’s promises are legally 
enforceable, public accountability in monitoring a project’s outcome and information to show 
successful delivery of promised benefits, and lastly, CBAs can play a key role in community 
development initiatives and can direct spending to underserved neighbourhoods (Graser, 2016). 
From this point of view, communities can use CBAs as a tool to challenge traditional powerful 
growth regimes (Rogers & Murphy, 2015). However, their success depends on the strength of the 
coalitions that advocate for benefits, the legality and clarity of the CBA conditions, and the 
mechanisms that are used for monitoring and enforcement (Parks and Warren, 2009). 
On the other hand, the challenges of CBAs include: inadequate organizing can result in poor 
outcomes in the CBA negotiation process, developers may not be willing to provide additional 
benefits, there can be significant legal expenses through hiring an attorney, community groups may 
be reluctant to sign a legal agreement, and lastly, it can be difficult building and maintaining a 
coalition with shared interests within a community (Gross, LeRoy, and Aparicio, 2005). Opponents 
of community benefit agreements argue that these agreements support rather than challenging a 
neoliberal agenda (Rogers & Murphy, 2015). The criticism is based on the view that local authorities 
and developers receive more advantages from these agreements than the local community 
particularly due to the uneven bargaining powers between developers and community members 
(Campbell et al., 2000). In some cases, there have been CBAs where developers had used bribes to 
silence opposition from communities and they were coerced to show support for projects they would 
have been opposed to (Rogers & Murphy, 2015). 
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These challenges show that CBAs are difficult to negotiate due to lack of transparency in the 
negotiation process, and due to local communities’ lack of skills, resources, or experience to 
successfully negotiate benefits with project stakeholders (Been, 2010). Furthermore, this analysis 
suggests that CBAs have been proven to be difficult to enforce and monitor in practice and often 
inherently benefit developers and promote government interests rather than community well-being 
(Been, 2010). This is described in Wolf Powers (2010) statement that “developers purchase public 
support with benefits that are inadequate to compensate deserving parties, or that will not reach them 
at all (p. 142).” The success of a CBA often depends on its level of engagement within a community. 
Hence, it is crucial for parties that enter into this type of legal agreement to understand and integrate 
this model in their consultation with community members. Within land development battles, a 
coalition needs to have strong common values to sustain itself, and not to break down when action is 
needed most (Lejano and Wessells, 2006). Currently, CBAs can be adopted within city- owned land, 
but to convince developers to incorporate them within private developments remains a challenge due 
to existing legislation such as property rights that do not permit these agreements. Hence, policy 
changes would be required to allow for this initiative. However, CBAs can be used in the majority of 
large-scale publicly funded developments. Since the City of Toronto has established CBA framework, 
communities are better equipped to understand in which context CBAs can be applied, and incorporate 
them into further projects. Additionally, groups experienced in negotiating community benefits such as 
Toronto Community Benefits Network (TCBN), community liaisons, and community development 
officers can greatly assist in holding developers accountable to their commitments. The Toronto 
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Community Benefits Network (TCBN) has already partnered in community benefit initiatives within 
Toronto including: the Eglinton Crosstown LRT, Finch West LRT, WestPark Hospital, MacDonald 
Block (Wellesley & College), and the Rexdale-Woodbine Casino (TCBN, 2019). In the next section, 
community assessment of CBAs will be discussed. 
Community Assessment 
Community coalitions emerge as a way of balancing power and to rally against a common cause and 
leverage a collective vision for progressive social change (Mizrahi and Rosenthal, 1993, p. 12). Hence, 
community coalitions are more likely to be successful if the motivation for formation comes directly 
from within the community (Wolff, 2001). The questions surrounding how CBAs must be regulated and 
implemented is based on “community power.” Often community groups are seen to have “little broad- 
based membership, are underfunded, and have little power except power derived from their militancy 
and their ability to apply pressure through direct action (Shragge, 1997, pp. 188-189).” CBAs give 
citizens a more meaningful role in the development process than through existing land use processes 
and most require local government involvement and support (Musil, 2012, p. 843). The power of the 
CBA coalitions often is derived from the political leverage that they acquire in the planning process. 
The reason for this is that the development process is contingent on receiving project approvals or 
zoning variances, and community actors can delay this process through protests (Parks & Warren, 2009, 
pp. 97-98). In terms of the implications of CBAs as a mechanism of building community power and 
wealth their results depend on the willpower of a community coalition. From this view, “a community’s 
ability to achieve a strong CBA is directly related to how much power it organizes and the strength of 
its coalition infrastructure (Partnership for Working Families, 2016, p. 6).” Hence, a transparent and 
inclusive community engagement process is critical to the success of  a CBA (Graser, 2016, p. 9). 
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In the article by Gross, LeRoy, and Aparicio (2005) it is stated: “community-based organizations 
will quickly lose credibility if they negotiate an increase in a project’s community benefits and then 
turn around and oppose the project (p. 26).” Therefore, the community group should not oppose or 
protest the project if they have signed a legally binding agreement with the developer. Therefore, 
community groups should be equipped to assess whether the benefits secured are a good tradeoff 
and if all parties are willing to follow the commitments made within the CBA. Thus, community 
enforcement is mandatory for effective monitoring to ensure that all parties are accountable to their 
obligations within the agreement (Partnership for Working Families, 2016, p. 8). Moreover, by 
hiring a third-party CBA national or regional organizer or negotiator mediator that has prior 
experience in negotiating CBAs can produce favorable outcomes to achieving community 
objectives (Musil, 2012, p.836). 
Arnstein’s Ladder for 
Citizen Participation is a planning 
theory that assesses the contribution 
of community members in the 
planning process. In Arnstein’s 
Ladder of Citizen Participation, there 
are eight rungs that symbolize a 
community’s level of participation in 
planning processes (Figure 11). 
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Through investigation of the case studies in chapter 3 & 4, most successful CBAs reached the 4- 6 
rung (Consultation, Placation, Partnership) of the ladder. The unsuccessful CBAs, on the other hand, 
reached the 1-3 rung (Manipulation, Therapy, and Informing). However, in future projects, active 
engagement through community benefit agreements can result in achieving a degree of citizen power 
and control within the planning process. 
Policy Recommendations 
The following recommendations are made for developers, government officials, community
 groups/residents, and third party mediators regarding community benefit agreements (CBAs). 
For Developers 
1. Within the process of securing community benefit agreements meaningful community
engagement should take place throughout the entire development process. This includes 
ensuring that all community groups are represented before the project is approved.
The initiation of a CBA is political and depends entirely on the developer’s willingness 
to enter into an agreement (Baxamusa, 2008, p. 268). As the developer is the main project stakeholder 
within the land development process it is within their best interest to engage in meaningful 
community engagement early in the development. This will ensurethat the voices of underrepresented 
groups are heard and to avoid conflict between stakeholders or the broader community in the later 
phases of the project development. There is criticism that some CBAs are negotiated from a limited 
community perspective because only the views of the CBA coalition are represented rather than the 
needs of the broader community (Musil, 2012, p. 839). 
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Therefore, significant effort needs to be made to accommodate marginalized and equity-seeking 
groups in the community such as translation services. The goal for ensuring accountability within the 
CBA process and to drive systematic change was “the notion in incremental and social-economic 
benefits working with local communities before and during the build of infrastructure and 
development projects becomes how you do business instead of an unusual thing (Participant 5, 
Personal Communication, 05/05/20).” Hence, early engagement with the project stakeholders is 
crucial to securing a CBA and constant community engagement and monitoring is critical to its 
success. Through genuine community engagement at the start of infrastructure projects can achieve 
equitable outcomes such as hiring, affordable housing, or environmental improvements. Through 
ongoing communication between community groups and a developer for a period of years after the 
development proposal, this ensures that the community can oversee the process and ensures 
accountability (Gross, LeRoy & Aparicio, 2005, p. 15). 
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For Government Officials 
1. To pass a federal by-law that makes legally binding Community Benefit
Agreements mandatory for all future large-scale infrastructure projects.
Fischer (2006) states that in order to empower communities, CBAs need to have higher political 
support and a redistribution of power. By passing a federal by-law that makes legally binding 
Community Benefit Agreements mandatory for all future large scale development projects this will 
ensure equitable development. Through participation in community benefit agreements (CBAs) by all 
parties within a development area, this holds the developers accountable to their promises. Therefore, 
meaningful community engagement, participation, and governance are mandatory to ensure project 
approval from governmental agencies. Particularly, making community benefits mandatory for all 
infrastructure projects at a federal level would assist in driving other policy objectives at provincial, 
and local levels (Participant 5, Personal Communication, 05/05/20). Furthermore, within the next ten 
years, over $187 billion will be spent on creating infrastructure projects across Canada within the next 
ten years (Snyder, 2020, para. 1). This gives rise to significant employment opportunities and 
community development initiatives for historically marginalized areas. To ensure that these projects 
are accountable for diverse communities consisting of indigenous and black peoples, women, veterans, 
youth, newcomers, and other historically disadvantaged groups, it is necessary to make community 
benefits a necessary part of all future infrastructure projects. 
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2. To merge community benefits within government existing policies
and legislation at all levels of government.
Merging community benefits agreements into legislation and policy documents is a method to ensure 
that “benefits,” are fulfilled within development and infrastructure projects. It is necessary to combine 
CBAs with other policy frameworks as larger institutions often require assistance in understanding their 
roles and responsibilities within these agreements (Participant 3, Personal Communication, 04/24/20). 
Furthermore, city and public officials as well as planners, can act as experts to educate the private and 
public sectors about the feasibility and technical details of specific proposals (Baxamusa, 2008, p. 270). 
As provincial and federal governments are in the midst of spending billions to create polices such as the 
Infrastructure for Jobs and Prosperity Act that support public infrastructure and workforce opportunities 
(Hanff, 2016, p. 58) taking steps to include community benefits should be at the forefront of these 
initiatives. The interview participants mentioned that promoting Community Benefit Agreements 
through all levels of government including municipal, provincial and federal levels is essential for their 
implementation. Currently, there are many provincial policies such as Bill 108: More Homes, More 
Choices Act that contradict existing many of the municipal initiatives such as Section 37, and does not 
allow for the procurement of additional community benefits from development projects. By aligning 
existing policies to support CBA implementation within all governmental jurisdictions can ensure that 
community benefits can be fulfilled within development projects across Canada.
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3. Develop a municipally mandated policy that requires the annual monitoring,
enforcement, and evaluation of CBAs within Toronto.
Gross, LeRoy & Aparicio (2005) state, “all CBAs should contain carefully-drafted provisions 
describing how the commitments made by developers will be monitored and enforced (p.14).” This 
includes clear roles, responsibilities, and time frames to be clearly outlined in the CBA agreement and 
upheld. Creating a municipal-led policy ensures the accountability of developers to fulfill their promises 
and create clear and realistic targets. This initiative needs to be municipally driven to be able to 
understand the local stakeholder population. By an interview participant it was explained that within the 
current planning process, there was a focus on “built form rather than social opportunities, and there 
“needs to be a development of standards that speak to community health (Participant 3, Personal 
Communication, 05/03/20).” To ensure effective implementation, within my interview findings it was 
recommended that “local municipal governments undertake inclusive community engagement prior to a 
bid, so procurement can be customized to engage and inform community groups along the way 
(Participant 5, Personal Communication, 05/05/20).” Furthermore, for annual monitoring was stated 
that there should be a requirement for progress reporting that allows for a request for feedback by 
residents that are impacted by a development that can be evaluated by the community and outlines 
specific targets and metrics (Participant 4, Personal Communication, 05/03/20). This can include 
requiring construction and engineering firms to provide mandatory annual reporting of secured 
community benefits and through the promotion of Community Employment Benefits (CEBs) which 
promote increased employment opportunities for at least three different minority groups (Snyder, 2020). 
In terms of enforcement, it was recommended that there be penalties for non-compliance and to create 
mechanisms to ensure accountability (Participant 2, Personal Communication, 04/15/20). Lastly, in 
terms of evaluation, a post-project evaluation by the community should also be taken into account in 
negotiations. 
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For Community groups/residents 
1. Within negotiations with developers, communities should advocate for benefits
that are measurable, clearly specified, and legally binding. This includes setting
realistic targets, allocating adequate resources, and assigning clear
responsibilities and commitments to all project stakeholders.
The emphasis on securing benefits is rooted in the “local community and has to come out of an 
authentic negotiation process (Participant 5, Personal Communication, 05/05/20).” Gross et al. (2005) 
recommend that substantial community outreach be required to understand a community’s needs and 
collaboration with these groups to build a coalition is needed to secure benefits (p. 14). Furthermore, 
CBA coalitions should assign a negotiating team or steering committee with members that have 
relevant experience to negotiate with a developer (p. 26). Lastly, if a lawyer is present in the 
negotiations, the CBA coalition should partake in negotiating directly with the lawyer (p. 23). The 
main challenges of implementing CBAs include that is often difficult to calculate or measure the 
amount private developers spend on the promised benefits. Furthermore, gathering this data is difficult 
to determine the fees and costs that the developers spent on CBAs (Marantz, 2015, pp. 263- 264). 
Therefore, creating benefits that are measurable and clearly specified is integral to this process. 
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2. Community organizations should connect with other coalitions nationally and internationally to
share resources and develop community benefit goals and initiatives. By sharing resources,
community organizations can mobilize to bring about community benefits and develop
frameworks for community-led planning initiatives.
Research initiatives can be pursued to develop models for reaching targets for affordability within 
Toronto and beyond. Some reputable organizations within the USA that have experience in advancing 
the use of CBAs include: the Partnership for Working Families, Good Jobs First, Centre on Policy 
Initiatives, and the Anne E. Casey Foundation (Musil, 2012, p.836). By forming broad coalitions with 
coordinated and specialized functions to maximize available resources and expand impact Through 
involving a variety of stakeholders in the process such as philanthropic foundations, local government 
agencies, consultants, developers, and more ideas can be shared about how to incorporate models for 
community benefits implementation. 
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For Third-Party Mediators 
1. Maintain a robust engagement process with residents that focuses on the
creation of a diversity of community benefits (i.e. affordable housing,
environmental mitigation, cultural contributions, etc.)
An independent agency can act as a third-party negotiator who has knowledge and experience in 
securing CBAs and needs to be present within these negotiations. Third- Party Mediators such as TBCN 
work as an independent agency to negotiate, implement and monitor CBAs by acting as a resource to 
government agencies, community groups, and the private sector to effectively regulate community 
benefit allocation (Graser, 2016, p. 27). Therefore, effective community engagement processes are 
essential to maintain a good relationship with stakeholders and to ensure the allocation of benefits based 
on the community’s input through weekly or bi-weekly meetings with community boards. Hence, in 
Toronto, the Toronto Community Benefits Network (TCBN) should be present within all community 
benefits negotiations to ensure accountability and to address any community concerns. 
2. Create a workforce hub in Toronto for training and job searching processes
within CBA agreements providing employment benefits.
As most CBAs include workforce and employment opportunities, there should be a hub allocated in
Toronto for equity-seeking groups to get resources and access to professional opportunities. This
includes providing services such as translation services, social workers, and to include additional
resources for youth and women. Furthermore, through the creation of a “workforce hub,” community
organizations, and government agencies could identify and recruit employees from target communities
and areas through a one-stop-shop.
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This includes creating a body of laborers that can come directly from the hub to minimize the costs and 
delays associated with training people on a project-by-project basis (Hanff, 2016, p. 58). Lastly, by 
creating a workforce hub would increase the number of projects that can utilize community benefit 
agreements. The creation of a diverse workforce hub can therefore assist to fulfill the “community 
benefits,” requirements of hiring minority groups within large-scale infrastructure projects (Graser, 2016, 
supra note 70). 
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Chapter 6: Appendix 
Interview Questions Set #1 
1. Tell me about yourself.
2. What is your experience or personal knowledge of community benefit agreements?
3. Have you worked on a project that involves negotiating CBA agreements? If so which
one?
4. In what ways do you believe CBA agreements have the capacity to give community
members a voice or bring positive changes to their communities?
5. What are the ways in which you believe CBAs could be restructured
to create more fair and equitable relations of power within the Planning process?
6. Do you believe that CBAs can create community wealth? If so, in what ways can it do
so?
7. Do you know of any recent examples of CBA agreements? In what ways were these
projects successful?
8. Do you think CBAs can be used to create an effective model for providing affordable
housing? If so, in what ways can they be used to achieve this?
9. Do you think there is a gap in the current planning process surrounding community
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